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Abstract
We study the problem of maximizing payoff generated over a period of time in a general
class of closed queueing networks with finite, fixed number of supply units which circulate in the
system. Demand arrives stochastically, and serving a demand unit (customer) causes a supply
unit to relocate from the “origin” to the “destination” of the customer. We consider general
controls including entry control, pricing, and assignment. Motivating applications include shared
transportation platforms and scrip systems.
Inspired by the mirror descent algorithm for optimization and the backpressure policy for
network control, we introduce a novel family of Mirror Backpressure (MBP) control policies.
The MBP policies are simple and practical, and crucially do not need any statistical knowledge
of the demand (customer) arrival rates.
Under mild conditions, we show that MBP policies lose at most O(KT +
1
K ) payoff per
customer relative to the optimal policy that knows the demand arrival rates, where K is the
number of supply units and T is the total number of customers over the time horizon. The
key technical challenge we overcome is that the number of supply units at any node can never
be negative. Simulation results in a realistic ridehailing environment support our theoretical
findings.
Keywords: backpressure; mirror descent; dynamic pricing; shared transportation platforms;
scrip systems; queueing.
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1 Introduction
The control of complex systems with circulating resources such as shared transportation platforms
and scrip systems have been heavily studied in recent years. Closed queueing networks (i.e., net-
works where a fixed number of supply units circulate in the system) provide a powerful abstraction
for these applications (Banerjee et al. 2016, Braverman et al. 2019). A widely adopted approach
for this problem is to solve the deterministic optimization problem that arises in the continuum
limit (often called the static planning problem), and show that the resulting policy is near-optimal
in a certain asymptotic regime. However, this approach only works under the assumption that (1)
the system parameters (demand arrival rates) are precisely known, and (2) the system is in steady
state. As is pointed out by Banerjee et al. (2016), relaxing either of these assumptions would be of
great interest.
In this paper, we relax both assumptions. We propose a family of simple, practical control
policies that are blind in that they use no prior knowledge of the system, and prove strong transient
and steady state performance guarantees for these policies. In simulations, our policies achieve
excellent performance that beats the state-of-the-art policies even in an unequal contest where the
latter policies are provided exact demand arrival rates whereas our proposed policies are given no
prior information about demand arrival rates.
Informal description of the model. For ease of exposition, our baseline setting is one
where entry control is the only available control lever. Later we allow other controls including
dynamic pricing of relocating resources, and flexible assignment of resources, and show that our
machinery and guarantees extends seamlessly. In our baseline entry control model, we consider
a closed queueing network consisting of m nodes (locations), and a fixed number K of supply
units that circulate in the system. Demand units with different origin-destination node pairs
arrive stochastically over slotted time with some stationary arrival rates which are unknown to
the controller. The controller dynamically decides whether to admit each incoming demand unit.
Each admission decision has two effects: it generates a certain payoff depending on the origin
and destination of the demand unit, and it causes a supply unit to relocate from the origin to the
destination instantaneously, if the origin node is non-empty. The goal of the system is to maximize
the collected payoff over a period of time.
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Notably, the greedy policy, which admits a demand unit if a supply unit is available, is generically
far from optimal: even as K →∞, the optimality gap per demand unit of this policy is Ω(1) even
in steady state. The intuition is that some nodes have no available supply an Ω(1) fraction of
the time in steady state under the greedy policy, and so the policy is forced to drop a significant
proportion of the demand which would have been served under the optimal policy.
Preview of our main result. We propose a large class of simple and practical control policies
that are blind (i.e., require no estimates of the demand arrival rates), and show that, under a mild
connectivity assumption on the network, the policies are near optimal. Specifically, we show that
our policies lose payoff (per demand unit) at most O
(
K
T +
1
K
)
relative to the optimal policy that
knows the demand arrival rates, where K is the number of supply units, T is the number of demand
units that arrive during the period of interest. Our result is non-asymptotic, i.e., our performance
guarantee holds for finite K and T , and thus covers both transient and steady state performance.
In particular, taking T →∞, we obtain a steady state optimality gap of O( 1K ), matching the state-
of-the-art policy of Banerjee et al. (2016), though that policy requires perfect estimates of demand
arrival rates, in sharp contrast to our policy which is completely blind. Our bound further provides
a guarantee on transient performance: the horizon-dependent term K/T in our bound on optimality
gap is small if the total number of arrivals T over the horizon is large compared to the number of
supply units K. Notably, our bound does not deteriorate as the system size increases in the “large
market regime”, where the number of supply units K increases proportionally to the demand
arrival rates (see the discussion after Theorem 1): here the number of arrivals T = Θ(K · T real),
where T real is the horizon in physical time, and we can rewrite our bound on the optimality gap as
O
(
1
T real
+ 1K
)
K→∞−−−−→ O
(
1
T real
)
.
We now motivate and introduce our control policies. First, we describe how our problem is one of
controlling a closed queueing network. Next, we describe the celebrated backpressure methodology
for blind control of queueing networks. We then outline the central challenge in using backpressure
in settings like ours. Finally, we introduce our proposed policies which significantly generalize
backpressure, and may be broadly useful.
Analogy with control of a closed queueing network. Our problem can be viewed as one
of optimal control of a closed queueing network. In the terminology of classic queueing theory, the
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K supply units are “jobs”, and each location in our model has both a queue of jobs (supply units)
as well as a “server” which receives a “service token” each time a demand unit arrives with that
location as the origin. Our model also specifies the “routing” of jobs: service tokens are labeled
with a destination queue to which the served job (supply unit) moves. Since jobs circulate in the
system (they do not arrive or leave), our setup is a closed queueing network. (Networks where jobs
arrive, go through one or more services, and then leave, are called open networks.)
Backpressure. Our control approach is inspired by the celebrated backpressure methodology
of Tassiulas and Ephremides (1992) for the control of queueing networks. Backpressure simply
uses queue lengths as the shadow prices to the flow constraints (the flow constraint for each queue
is that the inflow must be equal to the outflow in the long run), and chooses a control decision
at each time which maximizes the myopic payoff inclusive of shadow costs. This simple approach
has been used very effectively in a range of settings arising in cloud computing, networking, etc.;
see, e.g., (Georgiadis et al. 2006). Backpressure is provably near-optimal (in the large market
limit) in many settings where payoffs accrue from serving jobs, because it has the property of
executing dual stochastic gradient descent (SGD) on the controller’s deterministic (continuum
limit) optimization problem. As we discuss next, this property breaks down when the so-called
“no-underflow constraint” binds, making it very challenging to use backpressure in our setting
(indeed, this difficulty appears to be the reason that backpressure has not yet been proposed as a
solution to the control of ride-hailing platforms).
Main challenge: no-underflow constraint. The control policy must satisfy the no-underflow
constraint, namely, that each decision to admit a demand unit needs to be backed by an available
supply unit at the origin node of the demand. This constraint couples together the present and
future decisions, and presents a challenge in deploying the backpressure methodology in numerous
settings, including ours.
In certain settings this constraint does not pose a problem: For example, in the well known
“crossbar switch” problem in Maguluri and Srikant (2016), there are no “payoffs” apart from
the shadow prices (the goal is only to prevent queues from building up), so backpressure only
recommends to serve a queue with positive length (after all, backpressure only serves a queue if
it is longer than the destination queue) and so the no-underflow constraint does not bind. In
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several works that do include payoffs, the authors make strong assumptions to similarly ensure the
constraint does not bind.1 In our setting, payoffs are essential (there is value generated by serving
a customer), and so the constraint does bind.
A machinery that introduces virtual queues has been developed to extend backpressure to
settings where the constraint binds; see, e.g., (Jiang and Walrand 2009). The main idea is to
introduce a “fake” supply unit into the network each time the constraint binds, to preserve the
SGD property of backpressure. In open queueing networks, these fake supply units eventually leave
the system, and so have a small effect (under appropriate assumptions). In our closed network
setting, these fake supply units, once created, never leave and so would build up in the system,
leading to very poor performance. In Section 4.3, we provide a detailed discussion of the challenge
posed by the no-underflow constraint, and how it prevents us from using backpressure as is.
Our solution: Mirror Backpressure. In solving this problem, we introduce a novel class
of policies which we call Mirror Backpressure. MBP generalizes the celebrated backpressure (BP)
policy and is as simple and practical as BP. Whereas BP uses the queue lengths as congestion costs,
MBP employs a flexibly chosen congestion function to translate from queue lengths to congestion
costs. MBP features a simple and intuitive structure: for example, in the entry control setting,
the platform admits a demand only if the payoff of serving it outweighs the difference between
congestion costs at the destination and origin of the demand. Crucially, the congestion function is
designed so that MBP has the property that it executes dual stochastic mirror descent (Nemirovsky
and Yudin 1983, Beck and Teboulle 2003) on the platform’s optimization problem, with the chosen
mirror map.2 The mirror map can be flexibly chosen to fit the problem geometry arising from the
no-underflow constraints. Roughly, we find better performance with congestion functions which
are steep for small queue lengths, the intuition being that this makes MBP more aggressive in
protecting the shortest queues (and hence preventing underflow).
We develop a general machinery to prove performance guarantees for MBP: we draw upon
1For example, Dai and Lin (2005) assume that the network satisfies a so-called Extreme Allocation Available
(EAA) condition, which ensures that the no-underflow constraint does not bind; Stolyar (2005) assumes that payoffs
are generated only by the source nodes, which have infinite queue lengths. Huang and Neely (2011) consider networks
where the payoffs are generated only by the output nodes, and show that a variant of backpressure avoids underflow
entirely under this assumption. Gurvich and Ward (2014) assume that the network satisfies a so-called Dedicated
Item (DI) condition.
2The special case of the congestion function being the identity function corresponds to standard BP, which has
the property of executing stochastic gradient descent, a special case of mirror descent (Eryilmaz and Srikant 2007).
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the machinery for proving convergence of mirror descent with Lyapunov analysis in stochastic
networks, and show that they can be generalized to study MBP policies. Specifically, we provide
a ready Lyapunov function for any MBP policy. This is in sharp contrast to much of the queuing
literature, where finding a suitable problem-specific Lyapunov function has been quite an “art form”
(see, e.g., (Maguluri and Srikant 2016)).
Our work fits into the broad literature on the control of stochastic processing networks (Harrison
2000). Our MBP methodology for designing blind control policies with provable guarantees applies
to open queueing networks as well. We are optimistic that MBP will prove broadly useful in the
control of queueing networks.
Main contributions. To summarize, we make two main contributions in this paper:
(i) Propose a class of near-optimal control policies that are completely blind. In general
settings that consider entry control, pricing, and flexible assignment, we propose a family of dynamic
control policies, the Mirror Backpressure policies, that have a strong transient and steady state
performance guarantee. The MBP policies are simple and practical, and do not require any prior
knowledge of demand arrival rates, making MBP promising for applications.
(ii) Provide a framework for systematic design and analysis of policies for control
of queueing networks. Our control framework has a tight connection with mirror descent,
which makes the process of policy design and analysis both systematic and flexible, and allows
us to handle the challenging no-underflow constraint. The general machinery we develop can be
seamlessly leveraged to design policies with provable guarantees for a variety of settings. This is in
contrast with various intricate approaches in the queueing literature that do not easily generalize.
1.1 Applications
In Section 5 we generalize the baseline model (which allows entry control only) and include pricing
and flexible assignment as control levers. Our general model includes a number of key ingredients
common to many applications. We illustrate its versatility with the following applications, which
are also summarized in Table 1. In Appendix A we discuss in detail the application to scrip systems
(Item 3 below).
(1) Online control of ride-hailing platforms. Ride-hailing platforms make dynamic decisions to
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optimize their objectives (e.g., revenue, welfare, etc.). Here the nodes in the model correspond
to geographical locations, while supply units and demand units correspond to cars and customers,
respectively. For most ride-hailing platforms in North America, pricing is used to modulate demand,
which we capture by the pricing model we will introduce in3 Section 5. In certain countries such
as China, however, pricing is a less acceptable lever, hence admission control of customers is used
as a control lever instead. This corresponds to the entry control model described above. In both
cases, the platform can also decide where (near the demand’s origin) to dispatch a car from, and
where (near the demand’s destination) to drop off a customer. These scenarios are well captured
by the joint entry-assignment (JEA) and joint pricing-assignment (JPA) models to be introduced
in Section 5.
(2) Dynamic incentive program for bike-sharing systems. A major challenge faced by bike-sharing
systems such as Citi Bike in New York City is the frequent out-of-bike and out-of-dock events
caused by demand imbalance. One popular solution is to dynamically incentivize certain trips by
awarding points (with cash value) depending on a trip’s pickup and dropoff locations (Chung et al.
2018). The optimal design of a dynamic incentive program corresponds to the pricing setting of our
model. As we briefly discuss in Section 5, a simple adaptation of our control methodology allows
us seamlessly handle the additional constraints in a docked bikesharing system that there are only
a certain number of docks at each location.
(3) Scrip systems. A scrip system is a nonmonetary trade economy where agents use scrips (tokens,
coupons, artificial currency) to exchange services. These systems are typically implemented when
monetary transfer is undesirable or impractical. For example, Agarwal et al. (2019) suggest that in
kidney exchange, to align the incentives of hospitals, the exchange should deploy a scrip system that
awards points to hospitals that submit donor-patient pairs to the central exchange, and deducts
points from hospitals that conduct transplantations. Another well-known example is Capitol Hill
Babysitting Co-op Sweeney and Sweeney (1977) (see also Johnson et al. (2014)), where married
couples pay for babysitting services by another couples with scrips. A key challenge in these markets
is the design of the service provider selection rule: When there are several possible providers for a
trade, who should be selected for service? If an agent is running low on scrip balance, should they
3Our model there is similar to that of Banerjee et al. (2016), except that the platform does not know demand
arrival rates and we allow a finite horizon.
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be allowed to request services? We postpone the detailed discussion of how our model can facilitate
the design of a near optimal provider selection rule to Appendix A.
Application Control lever Corresponding setting in this paper
Ride-hailing in USA, Europe Pricing & Dispatch Joint pricing-assignment
Ride-hailing in China Admission & Dispatch Joint entry-assignment
Bike-sharing Reward points Pricing (finite buffer queues)
Scrip system Provider selection Joint entry-assignment (Appendix A)
Table 1: Summary of applications of our model, the control levers therein and the corresponding
settings in this paper. See Sections 2 to 4 for the entry control setting, and Section 5 for other
settings. For each setting, we design MBP policies that achieve an optimality gap O
(
K
T +
1
K
)
per
demand unit.
For the ride-hailing application, our assumption that cars relocate immediately is a common
simplification in the existing literature (Banerjee et al. 2016, Balseiro et al. 2019). Moreover, our
realistic simulations based on NYC yellow cab data show that our theoretical findings strikingly
retain their power even with relocation times, achieving excellent performance over both short and
long time horizons (Section 6).
1.2 Literature Review
MaxWeight/backpressure policy. Backpressure (also known as MaxWeight, see (Tassiulas and
Ephremides 1992, Georgiadis et al. 2006)) are well-studied dynamic control policies in constrained
queueing networks for workload minimization (Stolyar 2004, Dai and Lin 2008), queue length
minimization (Eryilmaz and Srikant 2012) and utility maximization (Eryilmaz and Srikant 2007),
etc. One of the main attractive features of MaxWeight/backpressure policies is that they can achieve
provably good performance without knowing anything beforehand about arrival/service rates. Most
of this literature considers the open queueing networks setting, where packets/jobs enter and leave,
and there is much less work on closed networks. An exception is a recent paper on state dependent
control of closed networks (Banerjee et al. 2018), which shows the large deviations optimality of
scaled MaxWeight policies. In Banerjee et al. (2018) the objective is throughput maximization,
and the demand arrival rates are assumed to satisfy a strong near balance assumption, as a result
of which it suffices to consider a non-idling policy (i.e., a “greedy” policy with assignment control
only). In this paper, however, the objective is more general and we allow very general demand
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arrival rates, which makes it necessary to deploy idling policies (e.g., entry control, pricing) to
achieve good performance. Another main contribution of this paper to the literature is that while
existing works use queue lengths or their power as congestion costs (Stolyar 2004), our policies use
a general increasing function (e.g., the logarithm) of queue lengths as congestion costs.
Applications: shared transportation, scrip systems. Most of the ride-hailing literature
studied controls that require the exact knowledge of system parameters: Ozkan and Ward (2016)
studied payoff maximizing assignment control in an open queueing network model, Braverman et al.
(2019) derived the optimal state independent routing policy that sends empty vehicles to under-
supplied locations, Banerjee et al. (2016) adopted the Gordon-Newell closed queueing network
model and considered various controls that maximize throughput, welfare or revenue. Balseiro et al.
(2019) considered a dynamic programming based approach for a specific network of star structure.
Banerjee et al. (2018) which assumes a near balance condition on demands and equal pickup costs
may be the only paper that does not require knowledge of system parameters. Comparing with
Banerjee et al. (2016) which obtains a steady state optimality gap of O( 1K ) (in the absence of travel
times) assuming perfect knowledge of demand arrival rates, our control policy achieves the same
steady state optimality gap with no knowledge of demand arrival rates, and further achieves a
transient optimality gap scaling of O(KT +
1
K ) for a finite number of arrivals T .
Our model can be applied to the design of dynamic incentive programs for bike-sharing systems
(Chung et al. 2018) and service provider rules for scrip systems (Johnson et al. 2014, Agarwal et al.
2019). For example, the “minimum scrip selection rule” proposed in Johnson et al. (2014) is a
special case of our policy, and our methodology leads to control rules in much more general settings
as described in Appendix A.
Other related work. A related stream of research studies online stochastic bipartite matching,
see, e.g., Caldentey et al. (2009), Adan and Weiss (2012), Busˇic´ and Meyn (2015), Mairesse and
Moyal (2016); the main difference between their setting and ours is that we study a closed system
where supply units never enter or leave the system. Network revenue management is a classical
dynamic resource allocation problem, e.g., see Gallego and Van Ryzin (1994), Talluri and Van Ryzin
(2006), and recent works, e.g., Bumpensanti and Wang (2018). Jordan and Graves (1995), De´sir
et al. (2016), Shi et al. (2019) and others study how process flexibility can facilitate improved
performance, analogous to our use of assignment control to maximize payoff (when all pickup costs
9
are equal), but the focus there is more on network design than on control policies. Again, this is
an open network setting in that each supply unit can be used only once.
1.3 Organization of the Paper
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. From Section 2 to Section 4 we focus on the
entry control setting as an illustrative example of our approach: Section 2 presents our model and
the platform objective. Section 3 introduces the Mirror Backpressure policy and presents our main
theoretical result, i.e., a performance guarantee for the MBP policies. Section 4 introduces the static
planning problem and describes the connection between the MBP policies and mirror descent. In
Section 5, we provide MBP policies for joint entry-assignment and joint pricing-assignment control
settings, demonstrating the versatility of our approach. In Section 6, we describe a simulation
study of MBP policies for ridehailing using NYC yellow cab data.
Notation. All vectors are column vectors if not specified otherwise. The transpose of vector or
matrix x is denoted as x>. We use ei to denote the i-th unit column vector with the i-th coordinate
being 1 and all other coordinates being 0, and 1 (0) to denote the all 1 (0) column vector, where the
dimension of the vector will be indicated in the superscript when it is not clear from the context,
e.g., eni .
2 Illustrative Model: Dynamic Entry Control
In this section, we formally define our model of dynamic entry control in closed queueing networks.
We will use this model as an illustrative example of our methodology.
We consider a finite-state Markov chain model with slotted time t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , where a fixed
number (denoted by K) of identical supply units circulate among m nodes (locations), indexed by
j ∈ V . In our model, t will capture the number of demand units (customers) who have arrived so
far (minus 1).
Queues (system state). At each node j, there is an infinite-buffer queue of supply units. (See
Section 5 for an extension to finite-buffer queues.) The system state is the vector of queue lengths
at time t, which we denote by q[t] = [q1[t], · · · , qm[t]]>. Denote the state space of queue lengths by
ΩK , {q : q ∈ Nm,1>q = K}, and the normalized state space by Ω , {q : q ∈ Rm,1>q = 1}.
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Demand Types and Arrival Process. We assume exactly one demand unit (customer)
arrives at each period t, and denote his type by (o[t], d[t]) ∈ V × V , where o[t] is his origin and
d[t] is his destination. With probability φjk, we have (o[t], d[t]) = (j, k), independent of demands
in earlier periods.4 Let φ , (φjk)j∈V,k∈V . Importantly, the system can observe the type of the
arriving demand at the beginning of each time slot, but the probabilities (arrival rates) φ are
not known. Thus we substantially relax the assumption in previous works that the system has
complete knowledge of demand arrival rates (Ozkan and Ward 2016, Banerjee et al. 2016, Balseiro
et al. 2019).
Entry Control and Payoff. At time t, after observing the demand type (o[t], d[t]) = (j, k),
the system makes a binary decision xjk[t] ∈ {0, 1} where xjk[t] = 1 stands for serving the demand,
xjk[t] = 0 means rejecting the demand. A supply unit moves and payoff is collected (or not)
accordingly as follows:
• If xjk[t] = 1, then a supply unit relocates from j to k, immediately. Meanwhile, the platform
collects payoff v[t] = wjk in this period. Without loss of generality, let maxj,k∈V |wjk|= 1.
• If xjk[t] = 0, then supply units remain where they are and v[t] = 0.
Because the queue lengths are non-negative by definition, we require the following no-underflow
constraint to be met at any t:
xjk[t] = 0 if qj [t] = 0 . (1)
As a convention, let xj′k′ [t] = 0 if (o[t], d[t]) 6= (j′, k′). A feasible policy specifies, for each time
t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . }, a mapping from the history so far of demand types (o[t′], d[t′])t′≤t and states
(q[t′])t′≤t to a decision xjk[t] ∈ {0, 1} satisfying (1), where (j, k) = (o[t], d[t]) as above. We allow
xjk[t] to be randomized, although our proposed policy will be deterministic. The set of feasible
policies is denoted by U .
System Dynamics and Objective. The dynamics of system state q[t] ∈ ΩK is as follows:
q[t+ 1] = q[t] +
∑
j∈V,k∈V
xjk[t](−ej + ek) . (2)
We use vpi[t] to denote the payoff collected at time t under control policy pi. Let W piT denote the
4This is equivalent to considering a continuous time model where the arrivals of different types of demands follow
independent Poisson processes with rates proportional to the (φjk)s. The discrete time model considered is the
embedded chain of the continuous time model.
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average payoff per period (i.e., per customer) collected by policy pi in the first T periods, and
let W ∗T denote the optimal payoff per period in the first T periods over all admissible policies.
Mathematically, they are defined respectively as:
W piT , min
q∈ΩK
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E[vpi[t]|q[0] = q] , W ∗T , sup
pi∈U
W piT . (3)
Note that we consider the worst-case initial system state. Define the infinite-horizon per period
payoff W pi collected by policy pi and the optimal per period payoff over all admissible policies W ∗
respectively as:
W pi , liminfT→∞ W piT , W ∗ , sup
pi∈U
W pi . (4)
We measure the performance of a control policy pi by its per-customer optimality gap (“loss”):
LpiT = W
∗
T −W piT and Lpi = W ∗ −W pi . (5)
3 The MBP Policies and Main Result
In this section, we propose a family of blind online control policies, and state our main result for
these policies, which provides a strong transient and steady state performance guarantee for finite
systems. We only require a mild connectivity assumption on the network for our result to hold.
3.1 The Mirror Backpressure Policies
We propose a family of online control policies which we call Mirror Backpressure (MBP) policies.
Each member of the MBP family is specified by a mapping of normalized queue lengths f(q¯) : Ω→
Rm, where f(q¯) , [f(q¯1), · · · , f(q¯m)]> and f is a monotone increasing function.5 We will refer to
f(·) as the congestion function, which maps each queue length to a congestion cost at that location,
based on which MBP will make its decisions.
We will later clarify the precise role of the congestion function: we will show that MBP executes
dual stochastic mirror descent (Beck and Teboulle 2003) on the fluid limit problem with mirror
map equal to the inverse of the congestion function. Similar to the design of effective mirror descent
5The methodology we will propose will seamlessly accommodate general mappings f(·) such that f = ∇F where
F (·) : Ω→ R is a strongly convex function, a special case of which is f(q¯) , [f1(q¯1), · · · , fm(q¯m)]> for some monotone
increasing (fj)s. Here it suffices to consider a single congestion function f(·), whereas in Section 5 we will employ
queue-specific congestion functions fj(·).
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algorithms, the choice of congestion function should depend on the constraints of the setting, leading
to an interesting interplay between problem geometry and policy design.
For conciseness, in this section we will state our main result for the congestion function
f(q¯j) , −
√
m · q¯−
1
2
j , (6)
and postpone the results for other choices of congestion functions to Appendix E (see also Remark
1). For technical reasons, we need to keep q¯ in the interior of the normalized state space Ω, i.e.,
we need to ensure that all normalized queue lengths remain positive. This is achieved by defining
the normalized queue lengths q¯ as
q¯i ,
qi + δK
K˜
for δK ,
√
K and K˜ , K +mδK . (7)
Note that this definition leads to 1>q¯ = 1 and therefore q¯ ∈ Ω.
Our proposed MBP policy for the entry control problem is given in Algorithm 1. MBP admits
a demand of type (j, k) if and only if the score
wjk + f(q¯j)− f(q¯k) (8)
is nonnegative and the origin node j has at least one supply unit (see Figure 1 for illustration of the
score). The score (8) is nonnegative if and only if the payoff wjk of serving the demand outweighs
the difference of congestion costs (given by f(q¯k) and f(q¯j)) between the demand’s destination k
and origin j. Roughly speaking, MBP is more willing to take a supply unit from a long queue and
add it to a short queue, than vice versa; see Figures 1 and 2. The policy is not only completely
blind, but also semi-local, i.e., it only uses the queue lengths at the origin and destination. Note
that the congestion cost (6) increases with queue length (as required), and furthermore decreases
sharply as queue length approaches zero. Observe that such a choice of congestion function makes
MBP very reluctant to take supply units from short queues and helps to enforce the no-underflow
constraint (1). See Section 4.3 for detailed discussion on the no-underflow constraint.
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𝑘𝑗
𝑓( 𝑞𝑗) 𝑓( 𝑞𝑘)−𝑤𝑗𝑘 +
payoff of 
accepting
congestion cost 
at origin 𝑗
congestion cost 
at destination 𝑘
Figure 1: The score (8); MBP admits
a demand unit only if the score is non-
nonnegative,
𝟎 queue 
length  𝑞
congestion 
cost 𝑓( 𝑞)
Figure 2: An example of a congestion func-
tion (a mapping from queue lengths to con-
gestion costs) which aggressively protects
supply units in near-empty queues.
ALGORITHM 1: Mirror Backpressure (MBP) Policy for Entry Control
At the start of period t, the platform observes (o[t], d[t]) = (j, k).
if wjk + f(q¯j [t])− f(q¯k[t]) ≥ 0 and qj [t] > 0 then
xjk[t]← 1, i.e., serve the incoming demand;
else
xjk[t]← 0, i.e., drop the incoming demand;
end
The queue lengths update as q¯[t+ 1] = q¯[t]− 1
K˜
xjk[t](ej − ek).
3.2 Performance Guarantee for MBP Policies
We now formally state the main performance guarantee of our paper for the dynamic entry control
model introduced in Section 2. We will outline the proof in Section C, and extend the result to
more general settings in Section 5.
Our result only requires a mild connectivity assumption on the demand arrival rates φ.
Condition 1 (Strong Connectivity of φ). Define the connectedness of φ as
α(φ) , min
S(V,S 6=∅
∑
j∈S,k∈V \S
φjk . (9)
We assume that φ is strongly connected, namely, that α(φ) > 0.
Note that Condition 1 is equivalent to requiring that for every ordered pair of nodes (j, k),
there is a sequence of demand types with positive arrival rate that would take a supply unit from
j eventually to k.
14
Theorem 1. Consider a set of m ∈ N locations and any demand arrival rates φ that satisfy
Condition 1. Then there exists K1 = poly(m,
1
α(φ)), M1 = O(m) and M2 = O(m
2), such that the
following holds.6 For the congestion function f(·) defined in (6), for any K ≥ K1, the following
guarantees hold for Algorithm 1
LMBPT ≤M1 ·
K
T
+M2 · 1
K
, and LMBP ≤M2 · 1
K
.
Remark 1. In Section 5 we obtain results similar to Theorem 1 in broader settings that allow
pricing and flexible assignment (Theorem 2, 3). In Appendix E (Theorem 4), we generalize Theorem
1 by showing that similar performance guarantees hold for a whole class of congestion functions that
satisfy certain growth conditions. For example, for both the logarithmic congestion function, i.e.
f(q¯) = c · log(q¯), and the linear congestion function, i.e. f(q¯) = c · q¯ with c > c0 for some
c0 = poly(m,
1
α(φ)), the same guarantee as in Theorem 1 holds with K1 = poly(c,m,
1
α(φ)), M1 =
poly(c,m), M2 = poly(c,m). However, the specific polynomials depend on the choice of congestion
function.
There are several attractive features of the performance guarantee provided by Theorem 1 for
the simple and practically attractive Mirror Backpressure policy:
(1) The policy is completely blind. In practice, the platform operator at best has access to
an imperfect estimate of the demand arrival rates φ, so it is a very attractive feature of the policy
that it does not need any estimate of φ whatsoever. It is worth noting that the consequent bound
of O
(
1
K
)
on the steady state optimality gap remarkably matches that provided by Banerjee et al.
(2016) even though MBP requires no knowledge of φ, whereas the policy of Banerjee et al. (2016)
requires exact knowledge of φ. The policy of Banerjee et al. (2016) will generically suffer a long
run (steady state) per period optimality gap of Ω(1) (as K →∞) if the estimate of demand arrival
rates is imperfect.7 Note that the greedy policy which admits a demand whenever a supply unit is
available also generically suffers a steady state per period optimality gap of8 Ω(1).
6Here “poly” indicates a polynomial. Also, M1 and M2 do not depend on α(φ).
7Fix any demand arrival rates φ with φjk > 0 for all j ∈ V, k ∈ V . Let φˆ be the estimated demand arrival rates.
Then the set of φˆ for which the optimality gap of the policy of Banerjee et al. (2016) (parameterized by φˆ) is Ω(1)
is open and dense in the set of possible estimates {φˆ ∈ Rm×m++ : 1>φˆ1 = 1}. Here R++ denotes the set of strictly
positive reals. A similar result holds for any given sparsity pattern of φ (i.e., when the arrival rates are zero for a
subset of origin-destination pairs), where the platform knows the sparsity pattern and estimates only the positive
entries. We omit the proofs; the main idea is that a fluid limit solution based on φˆ generically violates flow balance
at the nodes, so the fluid solution itself has an Ω(1) optimality gap, and so a randomized policy based on the fluid
solution as in Banerjee et al. (2016) inherits an Ω(1) optimality gap.
8To illustrate why greedy performs poorly, consider a two node example with nodes {j, k}, where all ws are equal
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(2) Guarantee on transient performance. In contrast with Banerjee et al. (2016) which pro-
vides only a steady state bound for finite K, we are able to provide a performance guarantee for
finite horizon and finite (large enough) K. The horizon-dependent term K/T in our bound on
optimality gap is small if the total number of arrivals T is large compared to the number of supply
units K.
It is worth noting that our bound does not deteriorate as the system size increases in the “large
market regime”, where the number of supply units K increases proportionally to the demand arrival
rates (this regime is natural in ride-hailing settings, taking the trip duration to be of order 1 in
physical time, and where a non-trivial fraction of cars are busy at any time, see, e.g., (Braverman
et al. 2019)). Let T real denote the horizon in physical time. As K increases in the large market
regime, the primitive φ remains unchanged, while T = Θ(K · T real) since there are Θ(K) arrivals
per unit of physical time. Hence, we can rewrite our performance guarantee as
W ∗T −WMBPT ≤M
(
1
T real
+
1
K
)
K→∞−−−−→ M
T real
.
(3) Flexibility in the choice of congestion function. Because of the richness of the class of
congestion functions covered in Appendix E which generalizes Theorem 1, the system controller
now has the additional flexibility to choose a suitable congestion function f(·). For example, in
our setting the performance guarantee for the congestion function given in (6) (Theorem 1) is more
attractive than that for the linear congestion function f(q¯) = c · q¯ (Remark 1) in the following way:
in the latter case the coefficient c needs to be larger than a threshold that depends on connectedness
α(φ) for a non-trivial performance guarantee to hold. (Thus, in order to choose c the platform
needs to know α(φ), whereas no knowledge of α(φ) is needed when using the congestion function
(6).) From a practical perspective, this flexibility can allow significant performance gains to be
unlocked by making an appropriate choice of f(·), as evidenced by our numerical experiments in
Section 6.
to 1, and φjk > φkj > 0 and φjj > 0, e.g., φjj = 0.5, φjk = 0.4, φkj = 0.1, φkk = 0. Then for any K > 0, in steady
state supply units “pile up” at k, and in fact there is no supply unit available at location j with probability 0.75,
and so 75% of the type (j, j) demand is lost under greedy. As K → ∞ the steady state per period payoff of greedy
is only 0.325, whereas the optimal policy and the MBP policy achieve payoff 0.7, because the latter policies serve all
the (j, j) demand (in the limit K →∞) by preserving some supply at location j.
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4 The MBP Policies and Mirror Descent
In this section, we discuss the main intuition behind the success of MBP policies, namely, that
they execute (dual) mirror descent algorithms on a certain deterministic optimization problem. In
Section 4.1, we define the deterministic optimization problem which arises in the continuum limit:
the static planning problem (SPP), whose value we use to upper bound the optimal finite (and
infinite) horizon per period W ∗T (and W
∗) defined in (3) and (4). In Section 4.2, we first review the
interpretation of the celebrated Backpressure (BP) policy as a stochastic gradient descent algorithm
on the dual of the SPP, and then proceed to generalize the argument to informally show that MBP
executes mirror descent on the dual of SPP. In Section 4.3 we discuss the main challenge in turning
the intuition into a proof, namely, the no-underflow constraint.
4.1 The Static Planning Problem
We first introduce a linear program (LP) that will be used to upper bound W ∗T and W
∗. The LP,
called the static planning problem (SPP) (see, e.g., Harrison 2000, Dai and Lin 2005), is defined
as:
maximizex
∑
j,k∈V
wjk · φjk · xjk (10)
s.t.
∑
j,k∈V
φjk · xjk(ej − ek) = 0 (flow balance) (11)
xjk ∈ [0, 1] ∀j, k ∈ V . (demand constraint) (12)
One interprets xjk as the fraction of type (j, k) demand which is accepted, and the objective (10)
as the rate payoff is generated under the fractions x. In the SPP (10)-(12), one maximizes the rate
of payoff generation subject to the requirement that the average inflow of supply units to each node
in V must equal the outflow (constraint (11)), and that x are indeed fractions (constraint (12)).
Let W SPP be the optimal value of SPP. The following proposition formalizes that, as is typical in
such settings, W SPP is an upper bound on the optimal steady state (per customer) payoff W ∗. It
further establishes that the optimal finite horizon per customer payoff W ∗T cannot be much larger
than W SPP.
Proposition 1. For any horizon T <∞ and any K, the finite and infinite horizon average payoff
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W ∗T and W
∗ are upper bounded as
W ∗T ≤W SPP +m ·
K
T
, W ∗ ≤W SPP . (13)
We obtain the finite horizon upper bound to W ∗T in (13) by slightly relaxing the flow constraint
(11).
4.2 MBP Executes Dual Stochastic Mirror Descent on SPP
The BP policy and our proposed MBP policies are closely related to the (partial) dual of the SPP:
minimizey g(y) , where g(y) ,
∑
j,k∈V
φjk · max
xjk∈[0,1]
xjk
(
wjk + yj − yk
)
. (14)
Here y are the dual variables corresponding to the flow balance constraints (11), and have the
interpretation of “congestion costs” Neely (2010), i.e., yj can be thought of as the “cost” of having
one extra supply unit at node j.
In the rest of this subsection, we informally discuss the interpretation of BP as stochastic
gradient descent, and the interpretation of MBP as stochastic mirror descent.
Review of the interpretation of BP as dual stochastic subgradient descent. Rich
dividends have been obtained by treating the (properly scaled) current queue lengths q as the
dual variables y, resulting in the celebrated backpressure (BP, also known as MaxWeight) control
policy, introduced by Tassiulas Tassiulas and Ephremides (1992), see also Stolyar (2005), Eryilmaz
and Srikant (2007). Formally, BP sets the current value of y to be proportional to the current
normalized queue lengths, i.e., y[t] = c · q¯[t] for some q¯ ∈ Ω defined, e.g., as in (7), and greedily
maximizes the inner problem in (14) for every origin j and destination k, i.e.,
xBPjk [t] =
 1 if wjk + c · q¯j [t]− c · q¯k[t] ≥ 0 and qj [t] > 0 ,0 otherwise . (15)
The main attractive feature of this policy is that it is extremely simple and does not need to know
demand arrival rates φ. The BP policy can be viewed as a stochastic subgradient descent (SGD)
algorithm on the dual problem (14) in the interior of the state space, i.e., when qj > 0 for all j ∈ V
Huang and Neely (2009). To see this, denote the subdifferential (set of subgradients) of function
g(·) at y as ∂g(y). Observe that the expected change of queue lengths under BP is proportional to
the negative of a subgradient of g(·) at y = c · q¯[t], in particular
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−K˜
c
· E[y[t+ 1]− y[t]] = −E[q[t+ 1]− q[t]] =
∑
j,k∈V
φjk · xBPjk [t](ej − ek) ∈ ∂g(y[t]) , (16)
where the first equality follows from the definition y[t] = c · q¯[t] and second equality is just the
system dynamics (2). Here
∑
j,k∈V φjk · xBPjk [t](ej − ek) ∈ ∂g(y[t]) since g is a maximum of linear
functions of y parameterized by x, hence g is convex and the gradient of a linear function among
these which is an argmax at y[t] (in particular, the linear function parameterized by xBP[t]) is a
subgradient of g at y[t].
(16) shows that the evolution of y[t] when q[t] > 0 is exactly an iteration of SGD with step
size c
K˜
. This interpretation of BP as stochastic subgradient descent leads to desirable properties
including stability, minimization of delay/workload, and revenue maximization in certain networks
(see, e.g., (Georgiadis et al. 2006, Eryilmaz and Srikant 2007, etc.)). However, as we will see in
Section 4.3, in our setting the SGD property of backpressure breaks on the boundary of state space,
i.e., when there exists j′ ∈ V such that qj′ = 0, due to the no-underflow constraints q ≥ 0.
MBP executes dual stochastic mirror descent on the SPP. The key innovation of our
approach is to design a family of policies generalizing BP (MBP given in Algorithm 1) that executes
stochastic mirror descent on the partial dual problem (14) (with flow constraints dualized), with q¯[t]
given by (7) being the mirror point and the inverse mirror map being the (vector) congestion function
f(q¯) , [f(q¯1), · · · , f(q¯m)]>. Mathematically, if q > 0, we have
−K˜ · E[q¯[t+ 1]− q¯[t]] = −E[q[t+ 1]− q[t]] =
∑
j,k∈V
φjk · xMBPjk [t](ej − ek) ∈ ∂g(y)
∣∣∣
y=f(q¯[t])
,
(17)
where xMBP[t] is the control defined in Algorithm 1; notice that the entry rule xMBP[t] has the
same form as that for BP (15) except that it uses a general congestion function f(qj), leading
to (17) for MBP via the same reasoning that led to (16) for BP. Thus, MBP performs stochastic
mirror descent on the partial dual problem (14), which generalizes the previously known fact that
BP performs stochastic gradient descent.
A main advantage of mirror descent over gradient descent is that it can better capture the
geometry of the state space via an appropriate choice of mirror map (see, e.g., (Nemirovsky and
Yudin 1983, Beck and Teboulle 2003)). In our setting, the congestion function f(q¯) is the inverse
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mirror map and can be flexibly chosen.
Our approach blending backpressure and mirror descent with a flexibly chosen mirror map is
novel. We believe it can serve as a general framework for systematic design of provably near optimal
backpressure-like control policies for queueing networks in settings with hairy practical constraints.
4.3 Challenge: No-underflow Constraints
As we have discussed earlier, the no-underflow constraints pose a challenge when applying back-
pressure to various settings. The following simple example illustrates how BP fails when the
proportionality constant c is not chosen to be sufficiently large.
Example 1 (BP is far from optimal if c is not large enough). Consider a network with three nodes
{1, 2, 3}, demand arrival rates φ12 = , φ23 = 13 + , φ21 = φ32 = 13 −  (where  < 13), and payoffs
w12 = w23 = w21 = 0, w23 = w > 0. Suppose the platform employs backpressure where the shadow
prices are taken to be proportional to (normalized) queue lengths y[t] = c · q¯[t]. Let q¯∗ be the
queue lengths correspond to the optimal dual variables in (14) with the additional constraint that
the queue lengths sum to K. Simple algebra yields q¯∗ = ( c−w3c ,
c−w
3c ,
c+2w
3c ). When c < w, q¯
∗ lies
outside the normalized state space q¯∗ /∈ Ω, hence the q¯[t] will never converge to q¯∗ and BP is far
from optimal.
Even if the platform uses BP with sufficiently large c to ensure that q¯∗ ∈ Ω, the existing analysis
of BP still fails, as is demonstrated below.
Example 2 (BP has positive Lyapunov drift at a certain state). Again consider Example 1 and
let c ≥ w. The existing analysis of BP is based on establishing that the “drift” defined by
E
[
‖q¯[t+ 1]− q¯∗‖22
∣∣∣ q¯[t] ]− ‖q¯[t]− q¯∗‖22
is strictly negative when ‖q¯[t] − q¯∗‖2 = Ω(K). Suppose at time t we have9 q¯[t] = (2c−w2c , 0, w2c); in
particular, queue 2 is empty. Note that at q¯[t], BP suggests fulfilling the demand going from 2 to 3,
but the platform cannot do so because of the no-underflow constraint. Straightforward calculation
shows that the “drift” is positive for large enough K if  < w6c .
9The integrality of the components of q[t] is non-essential, hence we assume all components of q[t] are integers.
Also, here we take the normalized queue lengths to be defined as q¯[t] , q[t]/K to simplify the expressions.
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In the following analysis, we show that the underflow problem is provably alleviated by MBP
policies with an appropriately chosen congestion function. For example, the MBP policy with con-
gestion function given in (6) is more aggressive in preserving supply units in near-empty queues
compared to BP, making the system less likely to violate the no-underflow constraints. Besides car-
rying formal guarantees, the MBP policy also achieves better performance than BP in simulations
(Section 6).
Proof sketch of Theorem 1. We now provide a very brief summary of the key ideas that
lead to a proof of Theorem 1, see Appendix C for more details. The proof combines and extends
the technical machinery of mirror descent and stochastic network controls. It is based on Lyapunov
analysis where the antiderivative of congestion function f(·) is chosen as the Lyapunov function.
For the f defined in (6), the Lyapunov function is
F (q¯) = −2√m
m∑
j=1
√
q¯j .
Based on the fact that MBP executes mirror descent, we bound the single period suboptimality of
MBP as the sum of Lyapunov drift and several auxiliary terms (Lemma 5). We then utilize the
structure of the dual problem (14) to bound the auxiliary terms (Lemma 7). Finally, we average
the one-step optimality gap over finite/infinite horizon to conclude the proof.
5 Pricing and Assignment Control
In this section, we allow the platform to have additional control levers beyond entry control and
consider two general settings, namely, joint entry-assignment control (JEA) and joint pricing-
assignment control (JPA). We also allow the queues to have finite buffers. We show that the
extended models enjoy similar performance guarantees to that in Theorem 1 under mild conditions
on the model primitives.
21
5.1 Congestion Functions for Finite Buffer Queue
Suppose the queue at node j has a finite buffer size10 dj , d¯jK for some d¯j > 0; here (d¯j)j∈V are
model primitives. Throughout Section 5, the normalized state space is
Ω ,
{
q¯ : 1>q¯ = 1, 0 ≤ q¯ ≤ d¯
}
, where d¯j , dj/K .
Similar to the case of entry control, we need to keep q¯ in the interior of Ω, which is achieved
by defining the normalized queue lengths q¯ as
q¯j ,
qj + d¯jδK
K˜
for δK =
√
K and K˜ , K +
∑
j∈V
d¯j
 δK . (18)
One can verify that q¯ ∈ Ω for any feasible state q. To avoid the infeasible case where the buffers are
too small to accommodate all supply units, we assume that
∑
j∈V d¯j > 1. The congestion function
f(·) is a monotone increasing function that maps each queue length to a congestion cost. Here we
will state our main results for the congestion function vector
fj(q¯j) =
√
m ·
(
(d¯j − q¯j)− 12 − q¯−
1
2
j
)
, ∀j ∈ V , (19)
and state the results for other choices of congestion functions in Appendix E. The intuition behind
(19) is to enable MBP to focus on queues which are currently either almost empty or almost full (the
congestion function values for those queues take on their smallest and largest values, respectively),
and use the control levers available to make the queue lengths for those queues trend strongly away
from the boundary they are close to.
5.2 Joint Entry-Assignment Setting
We first generalize the entry control setting introduced in Section 2 by allowing the system to
choose a flexible pickup and dropoff node for each demand. Formally, each node j has a pick-
up neighborhood P(j) ⊂ V,P(j) 6= ∅ and drop-off neighborhood D(j) ⊂ V,D(j) 6= ∅. The sets
(P(j))j∈V and (D(j))j∈V are model primitives.
The platform control and payoff in this setting are as follows. At time t, after observing the
10If the buffer size is infinite, we simply set dj = K, i.e., d¯j = 1, since the queue length never exceeds K.
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demand type (o[t], d[t]) = (j, k), the system makes a decision
(xijkl[t])i∈P(j),l∈D(k) ∈ {0, 1}|P(j)|·|D(k)| such that
∑
i∈P(j),l∈D(k)
xijkl[t] ≤ 1 . (20)
Here xijkl[t] = 1 stands for the platform choosing pick-up node i ∈ P(j) and drop-off node l ∈ D(k),
causing a supply unit to be relocated from i to l. The constraint in (20) captures that each demand
unit is either served by one supply unit, or not served. With xijkl[t] = 1, the system collects payoff
v[t] = wijkl. Without loss of generality, let
max
j,k∈V,i∈P(j),k∈D(k)
wijkl = 1 .
Because the queue lengths are non-negative and upper bounded by buffer sizes, we require the
following constraint to be met at any t:
xijkl[t] = 0 if qi[t] = 0 or ql[t] = dl .
As a convention, let xij′k′l = 0 if (o[t], d[t]) 6= (j′, k′). The dynamics of system state q[t] is as
follows:
q[t+ 1] = q[t] +
∑
j,k∈V 2,i∈P(j),l∈D(k)
(−ei + el)xijkl[t] . (21)
The definition of a feasible policy is similar to the case of entry control, hence we skip the details.
We once again define the transient and steady state optimality gaps LpiT and L
pi as in Section 2 via
(3)-(5).
The dual problem to the SPP in the JEA setting is
minimizey gJEA(y), for gJEA(y) =
∑
j,k∈V
φjk max
i∈P(j),l∈D(k)
(
wijkl + yi − yl
)+
. (22)
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MBP naturally generalizes to this setting, as described in Algorithm 2 below.
ALGORITHM 2: Mirror Backpressure (MBP) Policy for Joint Entry-Assignment
At the start of period t, the system observes (o[t], d[t]) = (j, k).
(i∗, l∗)← argmaxi∈P(j),l∈D(k)wijkl + fi(q¯i[t])− fl(q¯l[t])
if wi∗jkl∗ + fi∗(q¯i∗ [t])− fl∗(q¯l∗ [t]) ≥ 0 and qi∗ [t] > 0, ql∗ [t] < dl∗ then
xi∗jkl∗ [t]← 1, i.e., serve the incoming demand using a supply unit from i∗ and relocate it to l∗ ;
else
xijkl[t]← 0 for all i ∈ P(j), l ∈ D(k), i.e., drop the incoming demand;
end
The queue lengths update as q¯[t+ 1] = q¯[t]− 1
K˜
∑
i∈P(j),l∈D(k) xijkl[t](ei − el).
Our performance guarantee requires the following connectivity assumption on the primitives
(φ,P,D).
Condition 2 (Strong Connectivity of (φ,P,D)). Define the connectedness of triple (φ,P,D) as
α(φ,P,D) , min
S(V,S 6=∅
∑
j∈P−1(S), k∈D−1(V \S)
φjk . (23)
Here P−1(S) , {j ∈ V : P(j) ∩ S 6= ∅} is the set of origins that locations S can serve; D−1(·) is
defined similarly. We assume that (φ,P,D) is strongly connected, namely, α(φ,P,D) > 0.
Note that Condition 2 is equivalent to requiring that for every ordered pair of locations (i, l),
there is a sequence of demand types with positive arrival rates and corresponding pick-up, drop-off
nodes that would take a supply unit from i eventually to l. If P(j) = {j}, D(k) = {k}, then the
JEA setting reduces to entry control model in Section 2 and α(φ,P,D) = α(φ) for α(φ) defined
in (9).
We show the following performance guarantee, analogous to Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. Consider a set of m ∈ N locations, scaled buffer sizes d¯ = (d¯j)j∈V with d¯j > 0 and∑
j∈V d¯j > 1, and any (φ,P,D) that satisfies Condition 2. Then there exists ρ = ρ(d¯) < ∞,
K1 = ρ · poly
(
m, 1α(φ,P,D)
)
, M1 = O(m) and M2 = ρ ·O(m2), such that the following holds.11 For
the congestion functions (fj(·))j∈V defined in (19), for any K ≥ K1, the following guarantee holds
for Algorithm 2
LMBPT ≤M1 ·
K
T
+M2 · 1
K
, and LMBP ≤M2 · 1
K
.
11Here the poly(·) term in K1 does not depend on d¯, and “poly” indicates a polynomial. Also, M1 and M2 do not
depend on α(φ,P,D) and d¯.
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In Appendix E we generalize Theorem 2 by showing that a similar performance guarantee holds
for a large class of congestion functions.
5.3 Joint Pricing-Assignment Setting
In this section, we consider the joint pricing-assignment (JPA) setting and design the corresponding
MBP policy. The platform’s control problem is to set a price for each demand origin-destination
pair, and decide an assignment at each period to maximize payoff. The proposed algorithm is a
generalization of backpressure based joint-rate-scheduling control policies (see, e.g., (Lin and Shroff
2004, Eryilmaz and Srikant 2007)). For readability, here we only consider flexible pick-up locations,
i.e., D(k) = {k}, although the result easily generalizes to flexible drop-off locations.
The platform control and payoff in this setting are as follows. At time t, after observing the
demand type (o[t], d[t]) = (j, k), the system chooses a price pjk[t] ∈ [pminjk , pmaxjk ] and an assignment
decision
(xijk[t])i∈P(j) ∈ {0, 1}|P(j)| such that
∑
i∈P(j)
xijk[t] ≤ 1 . (24)
As before we require
xijk[t] = 0 if qi[t] = 0 or qk[t] = dk .
The result of the platform control is as follows:
(1) Upon seeing the price, the arriving demand unit will abandon with probability Fjk(pjk[t]),
where Fjk(·) is the cumulative distribution function of type (j, k) demand’s willingness-to-pay.
(2) If the demand stays (i.e., buys) and xijk = 1, the system dynamics follows (21). Meanwhile,
the platform collects payoff v[t] = pjk[t]− cijk where cijk is the “cost” of serving a demand unit of
type (j, k) using pickup location i.
(3) If the demand unit abandons, the supply units do not move and v[t] = 0.
We assume the following regularity conditions to hold for demand functions (Fjk(pjk))j,k. These
assumptions are quite standard in the revenue management literature, (see, e.g., Gallego and
Van Ryzin 1994).
Condition 3. 1. Assume12 Fjk(p
min
jk ) = 0 and that Fjk(p
max
jk ) = 1.
12The assumption Fjk(p
min
jk ) = 0 is without loss of generality, since if a fraction of demand is unwilling to pay p
min
jk ,
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2. Each demand type’s willingness-to-pay is non-atomic with support [pminjk , p
max
jk ] and positive den-
sity everywhere on the support; hence Fjk(pjk) is differentiable and strictly increasing on (p
min
jk , p
max
jk ).
(If the support is a subinterval of [pminjk , p
max
jk ], we redefine p
min
jk and p
max
jk to be the boundaries of
this subinterval.)
3. The revenue functions rjk(µjk) , µjk ·pjk(µjk) are concave and twice continuously differentiable.
As a consequence of Condition 3 parts 1 and 2, the willingness to pay distribution Fjk(·) has an
inverse denoted as pjk(µjk) : [0, 1] → [pminjk , pmaxjk ] which gives the price leading to any net demand
fraction µjk ∈ [0, 1]. In other words, Condition 3 ensures that the platform has sufficient flexibility
in choosing prices pjk ∈ [pminjk , pmaxjk ] to achieve any desired fraction of net (realized) demand.
Without loss of generality, let maxj,k∈V pmaxjk + maxi,j,k∈V |cijk|= 1.
In the JPA setting, the net demand φjkµjk plays a role in myopic revenues but also affects the
distribution of supply, and the chosen prices need to balance myopic revenues with maintaining a
good spatial distribution of supply. Intuitively, when sufficiently flexible pricing is available as a
control lever, the system will modulate the quantity of demand purely through changing the prices
(and serving all the demand which is then realized) rather than apply entry control (i.e., dropping
some demand proactively).
The dual problem to the SPP in the JPA setting is13
minimizey gJPA(y) for gJPA(y) =
∑
j,k∈V
φjk max{0≤µjk≤1}
(
rjk
(
µjk
)
+ µjk max
i∈P(j)
(−cijk + yi − yk)
)
.
(25)
Parallel to the derivation of Algorithm 1, we design the MBP policy by making it execute
stochastic mirror descent on gJPA(y): The mean fraction of demand realized under the policy will
be the outer argmax in the definition (25) of gJPA(y), and the assignment decision achieves the
inner argmax in the definition (25) of gJPA(y).
A key feature of MBP policy (see Algorithm 3 below) is that it does not require any prior
knowledge of gross demand φ, in contrast to the fluid-based policies as in Banerjee et al. (2016)
which need to know φ exactly. This is an attractive feature in many applications. Here we assume
that the willingness-to-pay distributions Fjk(·)s are exactly known to the platform; it may be
that demand can be excluded from φ itself.
13The derivation of the dual objective is in Appendix D.
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possible to relax this assumption via a modified policy which “learns” the Fjk(·)s, however, this is
beyond the scope of this paper.
ALGORITHM 3: Mirror Backpressure (MBP) Policy for Joint Pricing-Assignment
At the start of period t, the system observes (o[t], d[t]) = (j, k).
i∗ ← arg maxi∈P(j)
{−cijk + fi(q¯i[t])− fk(q¯k[t])};
if qi∗ [t] > 0, qk[t] < dk then
µjk[t]← argmaxµjk∈[0,1]
{
rjk(µjk) + µjk · (−ci∗jk + fi(q¯i∗ [t])− fk(q¯k[t]))
}
;
pjk[t]← F−1(µjk[t]);
xi∗jk[t]← 1, i.e., serve the incoming demand by pick up from i∗;
else
xijk[t]← 0 for all i ∈ P(j), i.e., drop the incoming demand;
end
The queue lengths update as q¯[t+ 1] = q¯[t]− 1
K˜
∑
i∈P(j) xijk[t](ei − ek).
Condition 3 ensures that Algorithm 3 has two key desirable properties:
(1) The computed prices satisfy pjk[t] ∈ [pminjk , pmaxjk ] (by the observation following Condition 3).
(2) The optimization problem for computing µjk[t] is a concave maximization problem (Condition 3
part 3), hence µjk[t] can be efficiently computed.
We have the following performance guarantee for Algorithm 3, analogous to Theorem 1.
Theorem 3. Consider a set of m ∈ N locations, d¯ = (d¯j)j∈V with d¯j > 0 and
∑
j∈V d¯j > 1,
minimum and maximum allowed prices (pminjk , p
max
jk )j∈V,k∈V , any (φ,P,D) (where D is identity)
that satisfy Condition 2, and willingness-to-pay distributions (Fjk)j∈V,k∈V that satisfy Condition 3.
Then there exist K1 < ∞, M1 < ∞ and M2 < ∞ such that for the congestion functions (fj(·))s
defined in (19), for any K ≥ K1, the following guarantee holds for Algorithm 3
LMBPT ≤M1 ·
K
T
+M2 · 1
K
, and LMBP ≤M2 · 1
K
.
See Appendix E for a general version of Theorem 3, where a similar performance guarantee is
shown for a family of congestion functions, e.g., for logarithmic and linear congestion functions.
The proof shows that, once again, M1 grows linearly with m and M2 is quadratic in m and both
these constants do not depend on α(φ,P,D), and K1 is polynomial in both m and 1α(φ,P,D) .
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6 Numerical Experiments
In this section, we simulate the MBP policy in a realistic ridehailing environment using yellow
cab data from NYC Taxi & Limousine Commission and Google Maps. We allow the platform
two control levers: entry control and assignment/dispatch control, similar to the JEA setting in
Section 5.2. Our theoretical model made the simplifying assumption that pickup and service of
demand are instantaneous. We relax this assumption in our numerical experiments by adding
realistic travel times. We consider the following two cases:
1. Excess supply. The number of cars in the system is slightly (5%) above the “fluid requirement”
(see Section 6.1 for details on the “fluid requirement”) to achieve the benchmark W SPP (the value
of the SPP (10)-(12)) in steady state. (Note that even with transit times it is still impossible to
beat W SPP in steady state since (11) and (12) must hold for the time average of x[t].)
2. Scarce supply. The number of cars fall short (by 25%) of the “fluid requirement”, i.e., there
aren’t enough cars to realize the optimal solution of SPP defined in (10)-(12), hence W SPP
cannot be achieved.
Summary of findings. We make a natural modification of the MBP policy to account for
finite travel times; specifically, we employ a supply-aware MBP policy which estimates and uses
a shadow price of keeping a vehicle (supply unit) occupied for one unit of time. We find that in
both the excess supply and the scarce supply cases, the MBP policy, which is given no information
about the demand arrival rates, significantly outperforms static (fluid-based) policy, even when the
latter is provided with prior knowledge of exact demand arrival rates. The MBP policy also vastly
outperforms the greedy non-idling policy, which demonstrates the practical importance and value
of proactively dropping demand.
6.1 Simulation Setup and Benchmark Policies
Throughout the numerical experiments, we use the following model primitives.
• Payoff structure. In many scenarios, ride-hailing platforms take a commission proportional to
the trip fare, which increases with trip distance/duration. Motivated by this, we present results for
wijk set to be the travel time from j to
14 k.
14We tested a variety of payoff structures, and found that our results are robust to the choice of w. One set of
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Figure 3: A 30 location model of Manhattan below 110-th street, excluding the Central Park.
(tessellation is based on Buchholz (2015))
• Graph topology. We consider a 30-location model of Manhattan below 110-th street excluding
Central Park (see Figure 3), as defined in Buchholz (2015). We let pairs of regions which share a
non-trivial boundary be pickup compatible with each other, e.g., regions 23 and 24 are compatible
but regions 23 and 20 are not.
• Demand arrival process, and pickup/service times. We consider a stationary demand arrival
process, whose rate is the average decensored demand from 8 a.m. to 12 p.m. estimated in Buchholz
(2015) (see Appendix F for a full description). This period includes the morning rush hour and
has significant imbalance of demand flow across geographical locations (for many customers the
destination is in Midtown Manhattan).15 We estimate travel times between location pairs using
Google Maps.16
• Number of cars, and steady state upper bound.
— Excess supply. We use as a baseline the fluid requirement Kfl on number of cars needed to
achieve optimal payoff. A simple workload conservation argument (using Little’s Law) gives the
fluid requirement as follows. Applying Little’s Law, if the optimal solution x∗ of SPP (10)-(12) is
realized as the average long run assignment, the mean number of cars who are currently occupied
picking up customers is
∑
j,k∈V
∑
i∈P(j) dijkφjkx
∗
ijk , for dijk , D˜ij +Djk, where D˜ij is the pickup
time from i to j and Djk is the travel time from j to k. In our case, it turns out that Kfl = 7, 307.
tests was to generate 100 random payoff vectors w, with each wijk drawn i.i.d. from Uniform(0,1); we found that the
results obtained are similar.
15We also simulated the MBP and greedy policy with time-varying demand arrival rates, where the demand arrival
rate is estimated (from the real data) for every 5 min interval. Our MBP policy still significantly outperforms the
greedy policy.
16The average travel time across all demand is 13.1 minutes, and the average pickup time is about 4 minutes (it is
policy dependent).
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We use 1.05×Kfl as the total number of cars in the system to study the excess supply case, i.e., there
are 5% extra (idle) cars in the system beyond the number needed to achieve the W SPP benchmark.
— Scarce supply. When the number of cars in the system is fewer than the fluid requirement, i.e.,
K = κKfl for κ < 1, no policy can achieve a steady state performance of W
SPP. A tighter upper
bound on the steady state performance is then the value of the SPP (10)-(12) with the additional
supply constraint ∑
j,k∈V
∑
i∈P(j)
dijkφjkxijk ≤ K . (26)
We denote the value of this problem for K = κKfl by W
SPP(κ). We study the case κ = 0.75 as
an example of scarce supply. For our simulation environment, it turns out that W SPP(0.75) ≈
0.86W SPP, i.e., 0.86W SPP is an upper bound on the per period payoff achievable in steady state.
We compare the performance of our MBP-based policy against the following two policies:
1. Static (fluid-based) policy. The fluid-based policy is a static randomization based on the solution
to the SPP, given exactly correct demand arrival rates (see, e.g., Banerjee et al. 2016, Ozkan
and Ward 2016). See Appendix F for details.
2. Greedy non-idling policy. For each demand type (j, k), the greedy policy dispatches from supply
location i that has the highest payoff wijk among all compatible neighbors of j
′ which have at
least one supply unit available. If there are ties (as is the case if the payoff wijk does not depend
on i), the policy prefers a supply location with shorter pickup time.
6.2 The Supply-Aware MBP Policy
We propose and study the following heuristic policy inspired by MBP, that additionally incorporates
the supply constraint. We call it supply-aware MBP. Given a demand arrival with origin j and
destination k, the policy makes its decision as per:
i∗ ← arg max
i∈P(j)
{
wijk + f(q¯i[t])− f(q¯k[t])− v[t]dijk
}
If wi∗jk + f(q¯i∗ [t])− f(q¯k[t])− v[t]di∗jk ≥ 0 and qi∗ [t] > 0 , dispatch from i∗, else Drop,
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where v[t] is the current estimate of the shadow price for a “tightened” version of supply constraint
(26). We define the tightened supply constraint as∑
j,k∈V
∑
i∈P(j)
dijkφjkxijk ≤ 0.95K , (27)
where the coefficient of K is the flexible “utilization” parameter, that we have set 0.95, meaning
that we are aiming to keep 5% vehicles free on average, systemwide.17 We update v[t] as
v[t+ 1] =
v[t] + 1
K
( ∑
j,k∈V
∑
i∈P(j)
dijkajk[t]xijk[t]− 0.95K
)+ ,
where ajk[t] = 1 if and only if (o[t], d[t]) = (j, k), otherwise ajk[t] = 0. An iteration of supply-aware
MBP is equivalent to executing a (dual) stochastic mirror descent step on the supply-aware SPP
with objective (10) and constraints (11)(12)(27).
We use the congestion function f(qi) = c log qi in our numerical simulations, with c = maxi,j,k∈V wijk.
6.3 The Excess Supply Case
We simulate the (stationary) system from 8 a.m. to 12 p.m. with 100 randomly generated initial
states (see Appendix F for details on the initial state generation). The simulation results on perfor-
mance are shown in Figure 4. The result confirms that the MBP policy significantly outperforms
both the static policy and the greedy policy: the average payoff under MBP over 4 hours is about
103% of W SPP (here W SPP is again an upper bound on the steady state performance18), while the
static policy and greedy policy only achieve 63% and 68% of W SPP, respectively. The performance
of the static policy converges very slowly to W SPP, leading to poor transient performance.19 The
performance of the greedy policy quickly deteriorates over time because it ignores the flow balance
constraints and creates huge geographical imbalances in supply availability.
17Keeping a small fraction of vehicles free is helpful in managing the stochasticity in the system. Note that the
present paper does not study how to systematically choose the utilization parameter.
18W SPP is still an upper bound on stationary performance when pickup and service times are included in our
model. However, in this case a transient upper bound is difficult to derive. As a result, we use the ratio of average
per period payoff to W SPP as a performance measure, with the understanding that it may exceed 1 at early times.
19For example, after running for 20 hours, and the average payoff generated by static policy in the 20-th hour is
0.96W SPP.
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6.4 The Scarce Supply Case
In the scarce supply case, e.g., K = 0.75Kfl, no policy can achieve a stationary performance of
W SPP; rather we have an steady state upper bound of W SPP(0.75) ≈ 0.86W SPP. We use this as
our benchmark.
Figure 5 shows that the MBP policy also vastly outperforms the static policy and greedy policy
in the scarce supply case. MBP generates average per period payoff that is 95% of the benchmark
W SPP(0.75) over 4 hours, while the static policy and greedy policy only achieves 65% and 74% resp.
of the benchmark over the same period. Reassuringly, the mean value of v(t) in our simulations of
supply-aware MBP is within 10% of the optimal dual variable to the tightened supply constraint
(27) in the SPP along with (27) (both values are close to 0.50). Again, we observe that the
average performance of static policy improves (slowly) as the time horizon gets longer, while the
performance of greedy deteriorates.
7 Discussion
We point out several interesting directions for future research, many of which we are actively
pursuing:
(1) Empty car repositioning. Our model allows for the payoff to depend on dispatch location. As
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such, we may interpret our model in terms of empty car repositioning, especially if travel times can
be incorporated.
(2) Time-varying demand arrivals. Since our policy is stationary and does not rely upon any
statistical knowledge of the demand arrival rates, it is promising for the situation where demand
arrival rate is time-varying.
(3) Improved performance via “centering” MBP based on demand arrival rates. If the optimal
shadow prices y∗ are known (or learned by learning φ via observing demand), we can modify the
congestion function to f˜j(q¯j) = y
∗
j + f(q¯j). For the resulting “centered” MBP policy, based on the
result of Huang and Neely (2009) and the convergence of mirror descent, we are optimistic that the
steady regret will be exponentially small in K as K increases.
Another promising direction is to pursue the viewpoint that there is an MBP policy which
(very nearly) maximizes the steady state rate of payoff generation, specifically for the choice of
congestion functions fj(·) that are the discrete derivatives of the relative value function F (q¯) (for
the average payoff maximization problem) with respect to q¯j ; see Chapter 7.4 of Bertsekas (1995)
for background on dynamic programming. Thus, estimates of the relative value function F (q¯) can
guide the choice of congestion function.
(4) Other applications of MBP. MBP appears to be a powerful and general approach to obtain near
optimal performance despite no-underflow constraints in the control of queueing networks. It does
not necessitate a heavy traffic assumption, and provides guarantees on both transient and steady
state performance. For example, the matching queues problem studied by Gurvich and Ward (2014)
is hard due to no-underflow constraints and to handle them that paper makes stringent assumptions
on the network structure. MBP may be able to achieve provably near optimal performance for more
general matching queue systems.
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Organization of the appendix. In this paper, we proved performance guarantees for three
settings: entry control (Theorem 1), joint entry-assignment control (Theorem 2) and joint pricing-
assignment control (Theorem 3). For most parts of the proof, the proof of the entry control case
can be easily extended to the other two cases. For particular lemmas/propositions, the proofs of
the JEA and JPA settings are more involved. For easier reading, we put analogous results together.
The appendix is organized as follows.
1. Appendix A provides a detailed discussion of the application of MBP to scrip systems.
2. In Appendix B we prove Proposition 1, i.e. that the value of SPP is an upper bound of the
best achievable per customer payoff. We also prove the counterpart of Proposition 1 for JEA
(Proposition 3) and JPA (Proposition 4) settings.
3. In Appendix C, we lay out the main lemmas needed for a proof to Theorem 1 (Lemma 5,
Lemma 6 and Lemma 7), and prove Theorem 1 assuming that these lemmas hold.
4. In Appendix D, we perform the Lyapunov analysis and analyze the geometry of the dual
problem (14), and prove Lemma 5 and Lemma 6.
5. In Appendix E we prove Lemma 7. We also prove a more general version of Theorem 1
(Theorem 4), and sketch the proofs of Theorem 2 and Theorem 3.
6. In Appendix F, we provide further details of the simulation setting.
A Application to Scrip Systems
In this section, we illustrate the application of our model to scrip systems (see Application 3 in
Section 1.1, where real world examples of scrip systems such as kidney exchanges and babysitting
co-ops are also discussed). We consider a service exchange with multiple agents and heterogeneous
services, where agents exchange scrips (i.e., artificial currency) for services. There is a central
planner who tries to maximize social welfare by making decisions over whether a trade should
occur when a service request arises, and if so, who should be the service provider. The setting
is closely related to the joint entry-assignment (JEA) setting introduced in Section 5. Using the
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methodology we developed earlier, we introduce a simple MBP control rule that asymptotically
maximizes social welfare.
A.1 Model of Scrip Systems
We now describe a model of a scrip system. As will become clear below, scrip systems (with a
central planner) can be modeled in a manner very similar to the JEA setting introduced in Section
5. To emphasize the connection, we point out the corresponding elements of the JEA model in
parentheses.
Service exchange. We study an economy with a finite number of agents indexed by i ∈ VD.
There are finitely many types of services indexed by j′ ∈ VS . (Here VD ∪ VS are the nodes in JEA.
Note that j′ ∈ VS will serve as virtual “destinations” but the drop-off neighborhood of j′ will be
a subset of VD and in particular, will not include j
′ itself. As a result, there will be no scrips at
nodes in VS at any time.) Consider a slotted time model, where each period exact one service
request arises, and with probability φij′ it is of type (i, j
′) (demand types in JEA), i.e., it comes
from agent i and requests type j′ service. Each agent has a skill set, i.e., the service types he20 can
provide. The skill set structure is modeled by the skill compatibility graph, which is an undirected
bipartite graph G = (VD ∪ VS , E) (see Figure 6 for an illustration). The neighborhood of i ∈ VD in
G is his skill set, which is denoted by N (i) ⊆ VS . The neighborhood of j′ ∈ VS in G consists of the
providers of type j′ service, which is denoted by N (j′) ⊆ VD. The payoff from serving a request
from agent i for type j′ service is wij′ . (The planner can choose a suitable value of wij′ based on
the estimated utility that agent i has for service j′, the cost incurred by the service provider, and
other relevant considerations.) Assume that an agent cannot fulfill his own service request. (For
request type (i, j′), {i} is the pickup neighborhood, N (j′)\{i} is the dropoff neighborhood21.)
Scrips. Denote the number of scrips (queue lengths in JEA) each agent has at time t as
q[t] = [q1[t], · · · , q|VD|[t]]. There are a fixed number (denoted by K) of scrips in the system, hence
q[t] ∈ ΩK where ΩK is defined in Section 2.
Central planner. We consider a central planner who tries to maximize social welfare, which
is defined as the per period average of collected payoff, over a finite/infinite horizon. The central
20For expository simplicity, we refer to an agent as “he” and the central planner as “she”.
21This slightly generalizes the JEA model as the drop-off neighborhood depends on demand type, but it poses no
technical difficulty.
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Figure 6: An example of skill compatibility graph in a service exchange with two job types and
four agents.
planner’s control levers include acceptance rule and provider selection rule (entry control and as-
signment in JEA): each time a type (i, j′) request arrives, she needs to decide whether to fulfill it,
and if so, who should be the service provider. As is typical in scrip systems, an agent is required
to have at least one scrip to request services (no-underflow constraint in JEA).
Comparison with the model in Johnson et al. Johnson et al. (2014). The work of Johnson et al.
Johnson et al. (2014) consider the case where there is only one type of service which all agents can
provide (i.e., G is a star graph), and φij′ is equal for all agents i. One one hand, we significantly
generalize their model by considering heterogeneous services, asymmetric service request arrivals,
and general skill compatibility graphs. They propose an optimal rule for the symmetric setting,
whereas we develop an asymptotically optimal control rule for the general setting. On the other
hand, we only focus on the central planner setting, and leave the incentives of agents for future
work (see the remarks in Appendix A.2).
A.2 MBP Control Rule and Asymptotic Optimality
Leveraging the similarity between the model introduced above and the JEA setting introduced
earlier, we are easily able to define a simple control rule based on MBP that achieves asymptotic
optimality in Algorithm 4 below. Here the congestion function f(·) can be chosen as in (6) since
buffers are effectively infinite (alternate congestion functions such as a logarithm/linear function
may be used instead; see Remark 1). Denote the normalized number of scrips (defined in (7)) in
the possession of agent i by q¯i.
39
ALGORITHM 4: MBP-based Acceptance and Provider Selection Rule for Scrip Systems
At the start of period t, the central planner receives a request from agent i for service j′.
if wij′ + f(q¯i[t])−mink∈N (j′)\{i} f(q¯k[t]) ≥ 0 and q¯i[t] > 0 then
k∗ ← argmink∈N (j′)\{i}f(q¯k[t]),
Let agent k∗ provide the service to i, and agent i gives one scrip to agent k∗ ;
else
Reject the service request from agent i;
end
A performance guarantee similar to Theorem 2 holds for Algorithm 4 under the following
connectivity condition of (φ,G).
Condition 4 (Strong Connectivity of (φ,G)). Define the connectedness of (φ,G) as
α(φ,G) , min
S(VD,S 6=∅
∑
i∈S
∑
j′∈N (VD\S)
φij′ .
We assume that (φ,G) is strongly connected, namely, α(φ,G) > 0.
We have the following performance guarantee.
Proposition 2. Consider a set of m agents and any (φ,G) that satisfies Condition 4. Then there
exists K1 = poly
(
m, 1α(φ,G)
)
, M1 = O(m) and M2 = O(m
2), such that the following holds. For
the congestion function f(·) defined in (6), for any K ≥ K1, the following guarantee holds for
Algorithm 4
LMBPT ≤M1 ·
K
T
+M2 · 1
K
, and LMBP ≤M2 · 1
K
.
The proof of Proposition 2 is very similar to that of Theorem 2; see Appendix E.
A few remarks on the model and results are in order:
1. Necessity of declining trades. By considering a more general setting than in Johnson et al.
(2014), we obtain qualitatively different insights on the optimal control rule by central planner.
In Johnson et al. (2014), it is optimal for the central planner to always approve trades, and
let the agent with fewest scrips be the service provider. In our general setting, however, in
many cases the central planner has to decline a non-trivial fraction of the trades to sustain
flow balance of scrips in the system (constraint (11)).22 When a trade is approved, our policy
22For example, consider a setting with two agents i1 and i2, who each specialize in a different service type N (i1) =
{j′1} and N (i2) = {j′2}. Under the mild condition φi1j′2 6= φi2j′1 , the planner will be forced to decline a positive
fraction of requests.
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also chooses the compatible trade partner with the fewest scrips as service provider.
2. Incentives. Our analysis of scrip systems is meant to illustrate the versatility of MBP control
policies, hence we only focused on the central planner setting. It would be interesting to
study the MBP control rule in the decentralized setting where the agents recommended to
be potential trading partners can decide whether to trade, but that is beyond the scope of
the current paper. (At a high level, we expect that agents will have an incentive to provide
service whenever requested by the MBP policy as long as (i) agents are patient, and (ii) agents
benefit from trading, i.e., derive more value from receiving service than the cost they incur
from providing service.)
B Finite Horizon Payoff Upper Bound: Proof of Proposition 1
In this section, we prove the finite horizon payoff upper bounds for entry control (Proposition 1),
JEA (Proposition 3) and JPA setting (Proposition 4).
B.1 Entry Control Setting
Recall Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. For any horizon T <∞ and any K, the finite and infinite horizon average payoff
W ∗T and W
∗ are upper bounded as
W ∗T ≤W SPP +m ·
K
T
, W ∗ ≤W SPP .
The idea behind Proposition 1 is as follows. As is typical in such settings, W SPP is an upper
bound to the long run expected payoff. We obtain a finite horizon upper bound in addition by
slightly relaxing the flow constraint (11) in the SPP to∣∣∣∣∣∣∣1>S
∑
j,k∈V
φjk · xjk(ej − ek)

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
K
T
∀ S ⊆ V , (28)
where 1S is the vector with 1s at nodes in S and 0s at all other nodes.
We establish two key lemmas to facilitate the proof of Proposition 1. The first lemma (Lemma
1) shows that the expected payoff cannot exceed the value of the finite horizon SPP defined by
(10), (28) and (12).
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Lemma 1. For any horizon T < ∞, any K and any starting state q[0], the expected payoff
generated by any feasible entry control policy pi is upper bounded by the value of the finite horizon
SPP defined by (10), (28) and (12).
Proof. Let pi be any feasible policy. For each pair j, k ∈ V , define
x¯jk[T ] ,
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E[xjk[t]|(o[t], d[t]) = (j, k)] .
In words, x¯(T ) is the average over 1 ≤ t ≤ T of the entry control decisions. We decompose the
time-average of payoff collected in the first T periods as:
W piT =
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E
 ∑
j,k∈V
1{(o[t], d[t]) = (j, k)} · wjk · xjk[t]

=
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
∑
j,k∈V
φjk · E
[
wjk · xjk[t]
∣∣(o[t], d[t]) = (j, k)]
=
∑
j,k∈V
φjk · wjk · x¯jk[T ] ,
where we only used the basic properties of conditional expectation. Similarly, for the time-average
of the change of queue length we have:
1
T
· E[q[T ]− q[0]] =
∑
j,k∈V
φjk · x¯jk[T ] · (ej − ek) .
Because there are only K resources circulating in the system, the net outflow from any subset of
nodes S ⊆ V should not exceed K. Since each individual x[t] satisfies (12), it must hold for x¯[T ].
Optimize over x¯[T ], we have that W piT is upper bounded by the optimization problem defined by
(10), (28) and (12) regardless of the initial configuration q[0]. This concludes the proof.
In order to facilitate the second key lemma, we first prove a supporting lemma (Lemma 2). We
call x a directed acyclic assignment if there is no sequence of node pairs C = ((j1, j2), (j2, j3), . . . ,
(js, js+1)) where js+1 , j1, jr ∈ V for r = 1, 2, . . . , s, such that
φjrjr+1 · xjrjr+1 > 0 ∀ r = 1, 2, . . . , s , (29)
In words, there is no cycle C such that there is a positive flow along C.
Lemma 2. Any feasible solution xF of the finite horizon SPP satisfying (28) and (12) can be
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decomposed as
xF = xS + xDAG , (30)
where xS is a feasible solution for the SPP satisfying (11) and (12), and xDAG is a directed acyclic
assignment satisfying (28) and (12).
Proof. The existence of such a decomposition can be established using a standard network flow
argument: Start with xS = 0 and xDAG = xF. Then, iteratively, if xDAG includes a cycle C with a
positive flow along C as above, move a flow of u(C) , min1≤r≤s φjrjr+1 · xjrjr+1 along C from xDAG
to xS, via the updates
xSjrjr+1 ← xSjrjr+1 +
u(C)
φjrjr+1
, xDAGjrjr+1 ← xDAGjrjr+1 −
u(C)
φjrjr+1
,
for all r = 1, 2, . . . , s. This iterative process maintains the following invariants which hold at the
end of each iteration:
• xS remains feasible for the SPP, in particular, it satisfies flow balance (11).
• xF = xS + xDAG remains true.
• It remains true that ∑
j,k∈V
φjk · xDAGjk (ej − ek) =
∑
j,k∈V
φjk · xFjk(ej − ek) .
i.e., xDAG has the same net inflow/outflow from each supply node as xF. In particular, xDAG
satisfies approximate flow balance (28).
Moreover, the iterative process progresses monotonically: Observe that xS (weakly) increases mono-
tonically, whereas xDAG (weakly) decreases monotonically (but preserves xDAG ≥ 0). Since we also
know that xS is bounded, it follows that this iterative process converges. Moreover, when it con-
verges, it must be that there is no remaining cycle with positive flow in xDAG, else it contradicts
the fact that the process has converged. Hence, xS,xDAG at the end of the process provide the
claimed decomposition.
Using this supporting lemma, we now establish the second key lemma which shows that the
value of the finite horizon SPP cannot be much larger than the value of the SPP.
Lemma 3. Let W SPPT be the value of the finite horizon SPP. This value is upper bounded in terms
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of the value W SPP of the SPP as
W SPPT ≤W SPP +m ·
K
T
.
Proof. We appeal to the decomposition from Lemma 2 to decompose any feasible solution xF to
the finite horizon fluid problem as
xF = xS + xDAG ,
where xS is feasible for the SPP and xDAG is a directed acyclic flow that is feasible for the finite
horizon SPP, i.e., satisfying (28) and (12). Hence, the objective (10) of the finite horizon fluid
problem can be written as the sum of two terms∑
j,k∈V
φjk · wjk · xFjk =
∑
j,k∈V
φjk · wjk · (xSjk + xDAGjk ) , (31)
and each of the terms can be bounded from above. By definition of W SPP we know that∑
j,k∈V
φjk · wjk · xSjk ≤W SPP .
We will now show that ∑
j,k∈V
φjk · wjk · xDAGjk ≤ m ·
K
T
.
The lemma will follow, since this will imply an upper bound of W SPP +m · KT on the objective for
any xF satisfying (28) and (12).
Consider xDAG. Since it is a directed acyclic assignment, there is an ordering (j1, j2, . . . , jm) of
the nodes in V such that all assignments move supply from an earlier nodes to a later node in this
ordering. More precisely, it holds that
xDAGjl,jr = 0 ∀ l > r . (32)
Now consider the subsets A` , {j1, j2, . . . , j`} ⊂ V for ` = 1, 2, . . . ,m − 1. Note that from (32),
xDAG does not move any supply from V \A` to A`. Hence we have
1>A`
∑
j,k∈V
φjk · wjk · xDAGjk (ej − ek)
 = ∑
j∈A`,k∈V \A`
φjk · xDAGjk
≤ K
T
∀ l = 1, 2, . . . ,m− 1 , (33)
where we made use of (28) to obtain the upper bound. Further, note that for each xDAGjl,jr with l < r,
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the term φjljr · xDAGjl,jr is part of the above sum for ` = l. Because maxj,k∈V |wjk|≤ 1, it follows that∑
j,k∈V
φjk · wjk · xDAGjk ≤
∑
j,k∈V
φjk · xDAGjk
≤
∑
1≤`<m
∑
j∈A`,k∈V \A`
φjk · xDAGjk
≤ m · K
T
.
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 1. The proposition follows immediately from Lemmas 1 and 3.
B.2 Joint Entry-Assignment Setting
The static fluid problem (SPP) in JEA setting is the following:
maximizex
∑
j,k∈V
φjk
∑
i∈P(j),l∈D(k)
wijkl xijkl (34)
s.t.
∑
j,k∈V
φjk
∑
i∈P(j),l∈D(k)
xijkl(ei − el) = 0 (flow balance) , (35)
∑
i∈P(j),l∈D(k)
xijkl ≤ 1 ∀j, k ∈ V , xijkl ≥ 0 ∀i, j, k, l ∈ V (demand constraint) . (36)
Proposition 3. For any horizon T <∞, any K and any starting state q[0], the finite and infinite
horizon average payoff W ∗T and W
∗ in the JEA setting are upper bounded as
W ∗T ≤W SPP +m ·
K
T
, W ∗ ≤W SPP .
Here W SPP is the optimal value of SPP (34)-(36).
Proof Sketch of Proposition 3. The only twist in this proof comparing to Proposition 1 is the def-
inition of directed acyclic assignment. Here we call x a directed acyclic assignment if there is no
sequence of node pairs
C = ((j1, j2), (j2, j3), · · · , (js, js+1))
where js+1 , j1, jr ∈ V for r = 1, 2, · · · , s, such that for any r = 1, · · · , s,
∃j, k ∈ V , s.t. jr ∈ P(j), jr+1 ∈ D(k) and φjk · xjr,j,k,jr+1 > 0 .
The rest of the proof proceeds exactly the same as in Proposition 1.
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B.3 Joint-Pricing-Assignment Setting
The static fluid problem (SPP) in the JPA setting is
maximizex
∑
j,k∈V
φjk
rjk
 ∑
i∈P(j)
xijk
− ∑
i∈P(j)
cijk · xijk
 (37)
s.t.
∑
j,k∈V
φjk
∑
i∈P(j)
xijk(ei − ek) = 0 (flow balance) (38)
∑
i∈P(j)
xijk ≤ 1 ∀j, k ∈ V , xijk ≥ 0 ∀i, j, k ∈ V (demand constraint) . (39)
Proposition 4. For any horizon T <∞, any K and any starting state q[0], the finite and infinite
horizon average payoff W ∗T and W
∗ in the JPA setting are upper bounded as
W ∗T ≤W SPP +m ·
K
T
, W ∗ ≤W SPP .
Here W SPP is the optimal value of SPP (37)-(39).
The main twist of the proof comparing to Proposition 1 is that the objective function in (37)
is no longer linear. We first prove a JPA version of Lemma 1.
Lemma 4. For any horizon T < ∞, any K and any starting state q[0], the expected payoff
generated by any JPA policy pi is upper bounded by the value of the finite horizon SPP:
maximizex
∑
j,k∈V
φjk ·
rjk
 ∑
i∈P(j)
xijk
− ∑
i∈P(j)
cijk · xijk

s.t. 1>S
∑
j,k∈V
φjk
∑
i∈P(j)
xijk(ei − ek)
 ≤ K
T
∀S ⊆ V
∑
i∈P(j)
xijk ≤ 1 ∀j, k ∈ V , xijk ≥ 0 ∀i, j, k ∈ V .
Proof. Let pi be any feasible JPA policy. For each pair j, k ∈ V and i ∈ P(j), define
x¯ijk[T ] ,
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E[F¯jk(pjk[t]) · xijk[t]|(o[t], d[t]) = (j, k)] .
In words, x¯ijk[T ] is the average rate over the first T periods of picking up type (j, k) demands from
node i.
Let Ujk[t] be the willingness-to-pay of a type (j, k) demand arriving at time t. We decompose
46
the time-average of payoff collected in the first T periods as:
W piT =
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
E
 ∑
j,k∈V
1{(o[t], d[t]) = (j, k), Ujk[t] ≥ pjk[t]}
∑
i∈P(j)
(pjk[t]− cijk) · xijk[t]

=
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
∑
j,k∈V
φjk · E
1{Ujk[t] ≥ pjk[t]} ∑
i∈P(j)
(pjk[t]− cijk) · xijk[t]
∣∣(o[t], d[t]) = (j, k)
 .
Because Ujk[t] is independent of pjk[t] and xijk[t], we have
W piT =
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
∑
j,k∈V
φjk · E
F¯jk(pjk[t]) ∑
i∈P(j)
(pjk[t]− cijk) · xijk[t]
∣∣(o[t], d[t]) = (j, k)
 .
Let µjk[t] , F¯jk(pjk[t]), and let xˆijk[t] , µjk[t] · xijk[t], we have
W piT =
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
∑
j,k∈V
φjk · E

 ∑
i∈P(j)
xˆijk[t]
 · F¯−1jk (µjk[t])− ∑
i∈P(j)
cijk · xˆijk[t]
∣∣(o[t], d[t]) = (j, k)

≤ 1
T
T−1∑
t=0
∑
j,k∈V
φjk · E

 ∑
i∈P(j)
xˆijk[t]
 · F¯−1jk
 ∑
i∈P(j)
xˆijk[t]
− ∑
i∈P(j)
cijk · xˆijk[t]
∣∣(o[t], d[t]) = (j, k)

=
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
∑
j,k∈V
φjk · E
rjk
 ∑
i∈P(j)
xˆijk[t]
− ∑
i∈P(j)
cijk · xˆijk[t]
∣∣(o[t], d[t]) = (j, k)
 .
Here the first inequality follows from the fact that F¯−1jk (·) is non-increasing, the last equality uses the
definition of revenue function rjk(·). Linearity of conditional expectation and conditional Jensen’s
inequality yields:
W piT ≤
∑
j,k∈V
φjk ·
− ∑
i∈P(j)
cijk · x¯ijk[T ] + 1
T
T−1∑
t=0
rjk
E
 ∑
i∈P(j)
xˆijk[t]
∣∣(o[t], d[t]) = (j, k)


 .
Use Jensen’s inequality again, we have
W piT ≤
∑
j,k∈V
φjk ·
− ∑
i∈P(j)
cijk · x¯ijk[T ] + rjk
 ∑
i∈P(j)
x¯ijk[T ]

 .
For the time-average of the change of queue length we have:
1
T
· E[q[T ]− q[0]] =
∑
j,k∈V
φjk
∑
i∈P(j)
x¯ijk(T ) · (ei − ek) .
Because there are only K resources in the system, the net outflow from any subset of nodes should
not exceed K. Note that x¯ must satisfy constraint (39). Optimize over x¯(T ), we obtain the desired
result.
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Proof Sketch of Proposition 4. The rest of the proof proceeds almost exactly the same as in Propo-
sition 1. The only caveat is that the equation (31) should be replaced by inequality
∑
j,k∈V
φjk
− ∑
i∈P(j)
cijk · xFijk + rij
 ∑
i∈P(j)
xFijk


≤
∑
j,k∈V
φjk
− ∑
i∈P(j)
cijk · xSijk + rij
 ∑
i∈P(j)
xSijk


+
∑
j,k∈V
φjk
− ∑
i∈P(j)
cijk · xDAGijk + rij
 ∑
i∈P(j)
xDAGijk

 .
Here the inequality follows from the subadditivity of non-negative concave functions.
C Proof Sketch of Theorem 1
In this section we provide the key lemmas that lead to a proof of Theorem 1. Our proof consists
of three steps:
1. In Appendix C.1, we use Lyapunov analysis to upper bound the suboptimality that MBP
incurs in one period by the sum of several auxiliary terms (Lemma 5). The auxiliary terms
are easier to control and have clear interpretations.
2. In Appendix C.2, we utilize the structure of the dual problem (14) to bound the auxiliary
terms introduced in the first step (Lemma 7).
3. In Appendix C.3, we average the one-step optimality gap obtained in previous steps over a
finite/infinite horizon, and conclude the proof of Theorem 1.
C.1 Single Period Analysis of MBP via Lyapunov Function
This part of the proof relies on the key observation we made in Section 4, i.e., that MBP policy
executes stochastic mirror descent on the dual objective function g(y) (the dual problem was defined
in (14)) except when underflow happens. As a result, our proof combines the standard approach
for stochastic mirror descent algorithms (see, e.g., (Nemirovsky and Yudin 1983, Beck and Teboulle
2003)) and a novel argument that bounds the suboptimality contributed by underflow.
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We use the antiderivative of f(·), which, for the congestion function f defined in (6), is
F (q¯) = −2√m
m∑
j=1
√
q¯j , (40)
as the Lyapunov function. Note that it is standard in the analysis of mirror descent to use the
Bregman divergence generated by F (·) as the Lyapunov function. Here we combine that approach
with the Lyapunov drift method (see, e.g., (Neely 2010)) in network control and use a slightly
different Lyapunov function, which streamlines the proof and yields sharper results. Recall that
W SPP is the optimal value of SPP (10)-(12), vMBP[t] denotes the payoff collected under the MBP
policy in the t-th period, and g(·) is the dual problem (14). We have the following result (proved
in Appendix D):
Lemma 5 (Suboptimality of MBP in one period).
W ∗ − E[vMBP[t]|q¯[t]] ≤ K˜ (F (q¯[t])− E[F (q¯[t+ 1])|q¯[t]])︸ ︷︷ ︸
T1
+
1
2K˜
·max
j∈V
∣∣f ′(q¯j [t])∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
T2
+
(
W SPP − g(f(q¯[t]))
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T3
+1
{
qj [t] = 0,∃j ∈ V
}︸ ︷︷ ︸
T4
. (41)
In Lemma 5, the LHS of (41) is the suboptimality incurred by MBP in a single period. On the
RHS of (41), T1 and T2 come from the standard analysis of mirror descent; T3 is the negative of
the dual suboptimality at y = (q¯[t]), hence it is always non-positive; T4 is the payoff loss because
of underflow.
In the next subsection, we outline our proof that the sum of the last three terms T2 + T3 + T4
is small. As a result, T1 is the main term on the right-hand side. Observe that it is proportional
to the Lyapunov drift : the negative of the expected change in the Lyapunov function in one time
step. The main intuition leading to the finite horizon performance guarantee in Theorem 1 is then
that if the suboptimality of MBP in some period is large, then (41) implies that there is also a
large negative Lyapunov drift.
C.2 Bounding Single Period Payoff Loss
In this section we proceed to upper bound T2 +T3 +T4 on the RHS of (41). Observe that the terms
T2 and T4 are non-negative, while T3 is non-positive, thus the goal is to show that T3 compensates
for T2 +T4. First notice that T2 is large when there exist very short queues (because the congestion
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function (6) changes rapidly only for short queue lengths), and T4 is non-zero only when some
queues are empty. Helpfully, it turns out that T3 is more negative in these same cases; we show
this by exploiting the structure of the dual problem (14).
In Lemma 6 we provide an upper bound for T3 that becomes more negative as the shortest
queue length decreases.
Lemma 6. Consider the congestion function (6), and any φ with connectedness α(φ) > 0. We
have
T3 ≤ −α(φ) ·
[
f
(
1
m
)
− f
(
min
j∈V
q¯j
)
− 2m
]+
.
We prove Lemma 6 in Appendix D by utilizing complementary slackness for the SPP (10)-(12).
The following lemma bounds T2 + T3 + T4. The proof is in Appendix E.
Lemma 7. Consider the congestion function (6), and any φ with connectedness α(φ) > 0. Then
there exists K1 = poly
(
m, 1α(φ)
)
such that for K ≥ K1,
T2 + T3 + T4 ≤M2 · 1
K˜
for M2 = Cm
2 where C > 0 is a universal constant. Here K˜ was defined in (7).
C.3 Proof of Theorem 1: Optimality Gap of MBP
Putting Lemma 5 and Lemma 7 together leads to the following proof of Theorem 1. The main idea
is to use the so-called Lyapunov drift argument of Neely (2010), namely, to sum the expectation of
(41) (the bound in Lemma 5) over the first T time steps. The terms T1 form a telescoping sum.
Proof of Theorem 1. Plugging in Lemma 7 into (41) in Lemma 5 and taking expectation, we obtain
W ∗ − E[vMBP[t]] ≤ K˜ (E[F (q¯[t])]− E[F (q¯[t+ 1])])+M2 1
K˜
for K ≥ K1 . (42)
Take the sum of both sides of the inequality (42) from t = 0 to t = T − 1, and divide the sum
by T . This yields
LMBPT = W
∗ −WMBPT ≤
K˜
T
(
E[F (q¯[0])]− E[F (q¯[T ])])+M2 1
K˜
≤ K˜
T
sup
q¯1,q¯2∈Ω
(
F (q¯1)− F (q¯2)
)
+M2
1
K˜
.
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Let M1 , supq¯1,q¯2∈Ω
(
F (q¯1)− F (q¯2)
)
. Observe that the function F (q¯) given in (40) is negative
F (q¯) ≤ 0 for all q¯ ∈ Ω, and is a convex function which achieves its minimum at q¯ = 1m1. Therefore
we have
M1 ≤ − inf
q¯∈Ω
F (q¯) ≤ −F
(
1
m
1
)
= m.
Hence the finite-horizon optimality gap of MBP is upper bounded by M1
K˜
T + M2
1
K˜
where M1 =
O(m), M2 = O(m
2) and M1, M2 do not depend on α(φ). Moreover, K˜ = K + m
√
K ∈ [K, 2K]
taking K1 ≥ m2. This concludes the proof.
D Lyapunov Analysis: Proof of Lemmas 5 and 6
D.1 Decomposition of Optimality Gap
D.1.1 Entry Control Setting: Proof of Lemma 5
Recall Lemma 5.
Lemma 5.
W ∗ − E[vMBP[t]|q¯[t]] ≤ K˜ (F (q¯[t])− E[F (q¯[t+ 1])|q¯[t]])︸ ︷︷ ︸
T1
+
1
2K˜
·max
j∈V
∣∣f ′(q¯j [t])∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
T2
+
(
W SPP − g(f(q¯[t]))
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T3
+1
{
qj [t] = 0,∃j ∈ V
}︸ ︷︷ ︸
T4
.
Proof. For congestion function f(q¯j) that is strictly increasing and continuous for each j, we consider
the Lyapunov function F (q¯) which is the antiderivative of f(q¯). The Bregman divergence associated
with f(q¯) is defined as:
DF (q¯1, q¯2) = F (q¯1)− F (q¯2)− 〈f(q¯1), q¯1 − q¯2〉 . (43)
Plug q¯1 = q¯[t+ 1], q¯2 = q¯[t] in (43) and rearrange the terms, we have:
F (q¯[t+ 1])− F (q¯[t]) = 〈f(q¯[t]), q¯[t+ 1]− q¯[t]〉+DF (q¯[t+ 1], q¯[t]) .
Subtracting 1
K˜
∑
j,k∈V wjk · φjk · xjk[t] on both sides and take conditional expectation given q¯[t],
we have:
E[F (q¯[t+ 1])|q¯[t]− F (q¯[t])− 1
K˜
∑
j,k∈V
wjk · φjk · E[xjk[t]|q¯[t]
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= − 1
K˜
∑
j,k∈V
wjk · φjk · E[xjk[t]|q¯[t]] + 〈f(q¯[t]),E[q¯[t+ 1]|q¯[t]]− q¯[t]〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
(I)
+E[DF (q¯[t+ 1], q¯[t])|q¯[t]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(II)
.
(44)
Let xNOMjk [t] be the “nominal” control that ignores the no-underflow constraint, i.e.
(xNOMjk )[t] =
 1 if wjk + f(q¯j [t])− f(q¯k[t]) ≥ 00 otherwise. (45)
It immediately follows that
(xMBPjk )[t] = (x
NOM
jk )[t] · 1{qj [t] > 0} . (46)
With a slight abuse of notation, denote xNOM as x˜, xMBP as x. Rearrange the terms in (I) and
plug in (46), we have
(I) = − 1
K˜
∑
j,k∈V
φjk ·
(
wjk + f(q¯j [t])− f(q¯k[t])
) · E[xjk[t]|q¯[t]]
= − 1
K˜
∑
j,k∈V
φjk ·
(
wjk + f(q¯j [t])− f(q¯k[t])
) · E[x˜jk[t]|q¯[t]]
+
1
K˜
∑
j,k∈V
φjk ·
(
wjk + f(q¯j [t])− f(q¯k[t])
) · 1{qj [t] = 0} .
By definition of MBP policy, we have:
− 1
K˜
∑
j,k∈V
φjk ·
(
wjk + f(q¯j [t])− f(q¯k[t])
) · E[x˜jk[t]|q¯[t]]
= − 1
K˜
∑
j,k∈V
φjk ·
(
wjk + f(q¯j [t])− f(q¯k[t])
)+
= − 1
K˜
· g(f(q¯[t])) .
Using the fact that f(·) is increasing and that maxj,k∈V |wjk|= 1, we have
1
K˜
∑
j,k∈V
φjk ·
(
wjk + f(q¯j [t])− f(q¯k[t])
) · 1{qj [t] = 0} ≤ 1
K˜
· 1{qj [t] = 0, ∃j} .
Combining the above inequality and equality yields
(I) ≤ − 1
K˜
· g(f(q¯[t])) + 1
K˜
· 1{qj [t] = 0,∃j} .
Now we proceed to bound (II). By definition of Bregman divergence, (II) is the second order
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remainder of the Taylor series of F (·). Using the fact that f(·) is increasing, we have23
(II) ≤ 1
2
∑
j∈V
E
[
f ′(q¯j [t])(q¯j [t]− q¯j [t+ 1])2|q¯[t]
]
≤ 1
2K˜2
·max
j∈V
f ′
(
q¯j [t]
)
.
Plug the above inequalities of (I) and (II) in (44), we have
E[F (q¯[t+ 1])|q¯[t]]− F (q¯[t])− 1
K˜
E[vMBP[t]|q¯[t]]
≤ − 1
K˜
· g(f(q¯[t])) + 1
2K˜2
·max
j∈V
f ′(q¯j [t]) +
1
K˜
· 1{qj [t] = 0, ∃j} .
Rearranging the terms yields:
−E[vMBP[t]|q¯[t]] ≤ K˜ (F (q¯[t])− E[F (q¯[t+ 1])|q¯[t]])+ 1
2K˜
·max
j∈V
f ′(q¯j [t])
− g(f(q¯[t])) + 1{qj [t] = 0,∃j} .
Using Proposition 1, we have W ∗ ≤ W SPP. Adding these two inequalities together concludes the
proof.
D.1.2 Joint Entry-Assignment Setting
For JEA setting, we have the following lemma which is analogous to Lemma 5.
Lemma 8. Consider congestion functions fj(·)s that are strictly increasing and continuously dif-
ferentiable. We have the following decomposition:
W ∗ − E[vMBP[t]|q¯[t]] ≤ K˜ (F (q¯[t])− E[F (q¯[t+ 1])|q¯[t]])+ 1
2K˜
·max
j∈V
f ′(q¯j [t]) (47)
+
(
W SPP − gJEA(f(q¯[t]))
)
+ 1
{
qj [t] = 0 or dj ,∃j
}
,
where gJEA(y) is defined in (22).
Proof Sketch. The proof is a direct extension of the proof of Lemma 5. The only difference is that
the actual control deviates from the nominal control not only when qj [t] = 0 for some j, but also
when qj [t] = dj for some j.
D.1.3 Joint Pricing-Assignment Setting
For JPA setting, we have the following lemma which is analogous to Lemma 5.
23For exposition simplicity, we ignore the difference between f ′(q¯j [t]) and f ′(q¯j [t+ 1]) in the Taylor expansion.
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Lemma 9. Consider congestion functions fj(·)s that are strictly increasing and continuously dif-
ferentiable. We have the following decomposition:
W ∗ − E[vMBP[t]|q¯[t]] ≤ K˜ (F (q¯[t])− E[F (q¯[t+ 1])|q¯[t]])+ 1
2K˜
·max
j∈V
f ′(q¯j [t]) (48)
+
(
W SPP − gJEA(f(q¯[t]))
)
+ 1
{
qj [t] = 0 or dj ,∃j
}
,
where gJPA(y) is defined in (25).
Proof Sketch. The proof is a direct extension of the proof of Lemma 5. To use the strong duality
argument, we prove below that gJPA(·) is indeed the partial dual function of the SPP (37)-(39).
Then because the primal problem is a concave optimization problem with linear constraint, strong
duality must hold.
Let y be the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to constraints (38). We have
gJPA(y) = max∑
i∈P(j) xijk≤1,xijk≥0
∑
j,k∈V
φjk
rjk
 ∑
i∈P(j)
xijk
+ ∑
i∈P(j)
(−cijk + yi − yk)xijk

=
∑
j,k∈V
φjk max∑
i∈P(j) xijk≤1,xijk≥0
rjk
 ∑
i∈P(j)
xijk
+ ∑
i∈P(j)
(−cijk + yi − yk)xijk

=
∑
j,k∈V
φjk max
0≤µjk≤1
max∑
i∈P(j) xijk=µjk,xijk≥0
rjk (µjk)+ ∑
i∈P(j)
(−cijk + yi − yk)xijk

=
∑
j,k∈V
max
0≤µjk≤1
(
rjk
(
µjk
)
+ µjk max
i∈P(j)
(−cijk + yi − yk)
)
.
D.2 Geometry of the Dual Function
D.2.1 Entry Control Setting: Proof of Lemma 6
Recall Lemma 6.
Lemma 6. Consider the congestion function (6), and any φ with connectedness α(φ) > 0. We
have
T3 ≤ −α(φ) ·
[
f
(
1
m
)
− f
(
min
j∈V
q¯j
)
− 2m
]+
.
Proof. Order the nodes in V in decreasing order of yj as yi1 ≥ yi2 ≥ · · · yim . For r = 1 to r = m−1,
we repeat the following procedure: if yir − yir+1 ≤ 2, then do nothing and move on to r + 1; if
54
otherwise, perform the following update:
yik ← yik −
(
yir − yir+1 − 2
) ∀1 ≤ k ≤ r .
Recall that g(y) =
∑
j,k∈V φjk[wjk + yj − yk]+. For the terms where j, k ∈ {i1, · · · , ir} or j, k ∈
{ir+1, · · · , im}, their value are not affected by the update. Consider the terms where j ∈ {i1, · · · , ir},
k ∈ {ir+1, · · · , im}: If yir − yir+1 > 2, then after the update
wjk + yj − yk ≥ wjk + yir −
(
yir − yir+1 − 2
)− yir+1 ≥ 2 > 0 ,
hence the update decrease these terms each by yir − yir+1 − 2. Finally, for the terms where j ∈
{ir+1, · · · , im}, k ∈ {i1, · · · , ir}, it is easy to verify that their value stay at zero after the update. To
sum up, such an update decreases g(y) by at least ∑
k≤r,k′≥r+1
φik,ik′
 · [yir − yir+1 − 2]+ .
Note that the first term is lower bounded by α(φ) defined in (9). As a result, after the finishing
the procedure, g(y) decreased by at least:
α(φ) ·
m−1∑
r=1
[
yir − yir+1 − 2
]+ ≥ α(φ) · [yi1 − yim − 2m]+ .
By strong duality we have miny g(y) = W
SPP, hence
g(y)−W SPP ≥ α(φ) ·
[
max
j∈V
yj −min
k∈V
yk − 2m
]+
.
Recall that the congestion cost is strictly increasing. This concludes the proof.
D.2.2 Joint Entry-Assignment Setting
Lemma 10. We have
gJEA(y)−W SPP ≥ α(φ,P,D) ·
[
max
j∈V
yj −min
k∈V
yk − 2m
]+
,
where W SPP is the value of SPP (34)-(36), and α(φ,P,D) is defined in (23).
Proof Sketch. The proof is a direct extension of the proof of Lemma 6.
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D.2.3 Joint Pricing-Assignment Setting
Lemma 11. We have
gJPA(y)−W SPP ≥ α(φ,P,D) ·
[
max
j∈V
yj −min
k∈V
yk − 2m
]+
,
where W SPP is the value of SPP (37)-(39), and α(φ,P,D) is defined in (23).
Proof Sketch. The proof is a direct extension of the proof of Lemma 6. The key observation is that:
if yi − yk ≥ 2 ≥ 2 maxi,j,k∈V |cijk|+p¯, then for any j ∈ P−1(i) we have
argmax{0≤µjk≤1}
(
rjk(µjk) + µjk · max
i∈P(j)
(−cijk + yi − yk)
)
= 1 ,
for any j ∈ P−1(k) we have:
argmax{0≤µji≤1}
(
rji(µji) + µji · max
k∈P(j)
(−ckji + yk − yi)
)
= 0 .
E Proof of Lemma 7
In this section, we prove Lemma 7. To this end, we need the following two lemmas, namely, Lemma
12 and Lemma 13.
We first define a growth condition for congestion functions. Lemma 12 will imply that if the
congestion cost (6) satisfies this growth condition, then Lemma 7 holds.
Condition 1 (Growth condition of congestion function). Consider congestion function f(·) that
is strictly increasing and continuously differentiable. Define
B(f) ,
{
q¯ ∈ Ω : f
(
1
m
)
−min
j∈V
f(q¯j) ≤ 4m
}
.
Denote B¯(f) , Ω\B(f). We say congestion function f(·)s satisfies the growth conditions with
parameters (K1,M1,M2) ∈ R3+, if the following holds.
• For fixed α > 0, there exists K1 = K1(α, f) > 0 such that ∀K > K1, ∀q¯ ∈ B¯(f),
α
(
f
(
1
m
)
−min
j∈V
f(q¯j)− 2m
)+
≥ 1
2K˜
·max
j∈V
f ′(q¯j) + 1{qj = 0,∃j} .
• There exists a universal constant M2 <∞ such that supq¯∈B(f) maxj∈V f ′(q¯j) ≤M2.
• For any q¯ ∈ B(f), we have q > 0.
56
• Let F (q¯) be the antiderivative of f , there exists M1 <∞ such that supq,q′∈Ω(F (q¯)−F (q¯′)) ≤M1.
Lemma 12. In the entry control setting, if a strictly increasing and continuously differentiable
congestion function f(·) satisfies the growth condition (Condition 1) with parameters (K1,M1,M2),
then for K ≥ K1,
T2 + T3 + T4 ≤M2 1
K˜
, (49)
where T2, T3, T4 are defined in (41).
Proof of Lemma 12. The lemma can be easily verified by plugging in Condition 1 to (49).
In the following lemma, we verify the growth conditions for the congestion cost function (6). In
addition, we also verify it for linear congestion cost and logarithmic congestion cost.
Lemma 13. Condition 1 is satisfied by the following congestion costs:
• Logarithmic congestion cost: f(q¯) = c · log(q¯), where c ≥ max
{
8m, 2α(φ)
}
.
• Inverse square root congestion cost: f(q¯) = √m · q¯− 12 .
• Linear congestion cost: f(q¯) = c · q¯, where c ≥ 2m2 + 2α(φ)m.
In particular, the corresponding parameters in Condition 1 (K1,M1,M2) for each congestion cost
is given by the following.
• Logarithmic congestion cost:
K1 = Θ
(
max
{
1
α2(φ)
,m2 ,
c
α(φ)
})
, M1 = Θ (m+ c logm) , M2 = Θ(cm) .
• Inverse square root congestion cost:
K1 = Θ
(
max
{
m
α(φ)
,
1
m2 · α4(φ) , m
2
})
, M1 = Θ(m) , M2 = Θ(m
2) .
• Linear congestion cost:
K1 = Θ
(
c
α(φ)
)
, M1 = Θ
(
max{c,m}) , M2 = Θ(c) .
Proof. Logarithmic function. Let δK =
√
K. Let q¯min be the solution of:
f
(
1
m
)
− f(q¯min) = 4m.
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We have q¯min =
1
m · e−
4m
c . It is not hard to see that B(f) = {q¯ ∈ Ω : minj∈V f(q¯j) ≥ q¯min}. The
growth condition given by Definition 1 can be written equivalently as the following inequalities:
α
c · log( Km +√K√
K
)
− 2m
 ≥ c
2
· 1√
K
+ 1 (50)
α
(
c · log
(
1
mq¯
)
− 2m
)
≥ c
2(K +m
√
K)
· 1
q¯
∀q¯ ∈
( √
K
K +m
√
K
, q¯min
)
(51)
1
m
· e− 4mc >
√
K
K +m
√
K
. (52)
It is easy to verify that the function obtained by subtracting the RHS of (51) from the LHS of (51)
has the only stationary point at q¯ = 1
2α(K+m
√
K)
. As a result, it suffices for the inequality to hold
for the endpoints of the interval and the stationary point: the inequality for the left endpoint is
subsumed by (50), hence we can replace (51) by:
α
(
c · log
(
1
mq¯min
)
− 2m
)
≥ c
2(K +m
√
K)
· 1
q¯min
, (53)
α
c · log(2α(K +m√K)
m
)
− 2m
 ≥ αc . (54)
For the congestion cost to satisfy the growth condition given by Definition 1, it suffices to find a c
and K1 such that (50)(52)(53)(54) hold. A sufficient condition for (50) to hold is:
K1 ≥ m2e
1
α
√
K1
+ 2
c (
1
α
+2m)
.
A sufficient condition for (52) to hold is:
K1 > m
2e
8m
c .
A sufficient condition for (53) to hold is:
K1 ≥ c
4α
e
4m
c .
A sufficient condition for (54) to hold is:
K1 ≥ 2m
α
e
2m
c .
Combined, a sufficient condition for (50)(52)(53)(54) to hold is:
K1 ≥ 2e 8mc ·max
{
m2e
1
α(φ)
√
K1
+ 2
α(φ)c ,
m
α(φ)
,
c
α(φ)
}
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Thus, for
c ≥ poly
(
m,
1
α(φ)
)
, max
{
8m,
2
α(φ)
}
K1 = poly
(
c,m,
1
α(φ)
)
, 6 max
{
1
α2(φ)
,
m
α(φ)
,
c
α(φ)
,m2
}
,
Condition 1 holds.
We proceed to bound M1 and M2. Note that
sup
q,q′∈ΩK
(
F (q¯)− F (q¯′)) = c · sup
q,q′∈ΩK
∑
j
q¯j log q¯j −
∑
j
q¯′j log q¯
′
j

≤ − c · min
q′∈ΩK
∑
j
q¯′j log q¯
′
j
= c logm,
where the inequality follows from the fact that q¯j ∈ (0, 1). Hence
M1 = poly(c,m) = m+ c logm.
For M2 we have
M2 = max
q¯∈Bf
max
j
|f ′(q¯j)|= f ′(q¯min) ≤ poly(c,m) = 2cm ,
where the last inequality follows from the definition of q¯min.
Inverse square root function. Now we consider the inverse square root function. Similar to
the analysis above, we have the following inequalities:
α
(
c ·
√
m+
√
K − c · √m− 2m
)
≥ c
4
K−
1
2
√
m+
√
K + 1 , (55)
α
(
c · q¯− 12 − c · √m− 2m
)
≥ c
4
(
m
√
K +K
)−1
q¯−
3
2 , ∀q¯ ∈
( √
K
K +m
√
K
, q¯min
)
(56)
q¯min ≥ 1
m+
√
K
. (57)
Where c · q¯−
1
2
min − c ·
√
m = 4m. Let c =
√
m, hence q¯min =
1
25m , and a sufficient condition for the
above inequalities to hold is:
K1 ≥ 60
(
1
2α
√
m
+
√
m
)4
,
K1 ≥ 125m
8α
,
K1 ≥ 625m2 ,
59
K1 ≥ 360m
2
α2
.
To sum up, the above condition is:
K1 = poly
(
m,
1
α(φ)
)
, Θ
max{ m2
α2(φ)
,
1
m2 · α4(φ)
} .
Now we proceed to bound M1 and M2. For M1 we have
sup
q,q′∈ΩK
(
F (q¯)− F (q¯′)) = 2c · sup
q,q′∈ΩK
∑
j
√
q¯j −
∑
j
√
q¯′j

≤ 2cm
√
1
m
= 2m,
Hence M1 = O(m). Similar to the logarithmic function case we have
M2 = f
′(q¯min) ≤ poly(m) = 70m2 .
Linear Function. Similar to the analysis above, we have:
α
(
c ·
(
1
m
− 0
)
− 2m
)
≥ c
2K
+ 1 ,
α
(
c ·
(
1
m
− cq¯min
)
− 2m
)
≥ c
2K
,
c ·
(
1
m
− q¯min
)
= 4m, q¯min > 0 .
A sufficient condition for the above inequalities to hold is:
K1 ≥ c
2
· 1
α
(
c
m − 2m
)− 1
K1 ≥ c
2
· 1
α
(
c
(
1
m − q¯min
)
− 2m
)
q¯min =
1
m
− 4m
c
> 0 .
A sufficient condition is:
K1 ≥ poly
(
m,
1
α(φ)
)
, c
4α(φ)m
, c ≥ 4m2 + 2m
α(φ)
.
In this case we have
M1 = m+ c , M2 = c .
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Proof of Lemma 7. Lemma 7 immediately follows from Lemma 12 and Lemma 13.
Following the same approach in the proof of Theorem 1, we can prove its general version which
is stated as follows. The proof follows from Lemma 5, 6 and 12.
Theorem 4 (General result for entry control setting). Consider a set of m ∈ N locations and any
demand arrival rates φ that satisfies Condition 1, and congestion function f(·) that satisfies the
growth condition given in Definition 1. Then there exists K1 = K
(
α(φ), f
)
such that the following
guarantees hold for Algorithm 1
LMBPT ≤M1 ·
K
T
+M2 · 1
K
,
where
M1 = sup
q¯1,q¯2∈Ω
(F (q¯1)− F (q¯2)) , M2 = C .
Proof Sketch of Theorem 2. The proof is a direct extension of the proof of Theorem 1: by plugging
Lemma 10 in Lemma 8, then showing the growth condition analogous to the above, the result
naturally follows.
Proof Sketch of Theorem 3. The proof is a direct extension of the proof of Theorem 1: by plugging
Lemma 11 in Lemma 9, then showing the growth condition analogous to the above, the result
naturally follows.
F Appendix to Section 6
In this section we provide some additional details regarding our simulation environment and the
benchmark we employ.
Model Primitives.
• Demand arrival process. Using the estimation in Buchholz (2015), which is based on Man-
hattan’s taxi trip data during August and September in 2012, we obtain the (average) demand
arrival rates for each origin-destination pair during the day (7 a.m. to 4 p.m.).
• Pickup/service times. We extract the pairwise travel time between region centroids (marked
by the dots in Figure 3) using Google Maps, denoted by Dij ’s (i, j = 1, · · · , 30). We use Djk as
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service time for customers traveling from j to k. For each customer at j who is picked up by a
supply from i we add a pickup time 24 of D˜ij = max{Dij , 2 minutes}.
Benchmark policy: static fluid-based policy. We consider the fluid-based randomized
policy (Banerjee et al. 2016, Ozkan and Ward 2016) as a benchmark. Let x∗ be a solution of SPP.
When a type (j, k) demand arrives at location j, the randomized fluid-based policy dispatches from
location i ∈ N (j) with probability x∗ijk.
Initial state generation. We first uniformly sample 100 points from the simplex {q :∑
i∈VS qi = K}, which are used as the system’s initial states at 6 a.m. (note that all the cars
are free). Then we “warm-up” the system by employing the static policy from 6 a.m. to 8 a.m.,
assuming the demand arrival process during this period to be stationary (with the average demand
arrival rate during this period as mean). Finally, we use the system’s states at 8 a.m. as the initial
states for the simulations in Section 6.
24We use the inflated Dij ’s as pickup times to account for delays in finding or waiting for the customer.
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